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THE MARKET FOR LEGAL EDUCATION & FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION: WHY THE "SOLOMON AMENDMENT" IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LAW SCHOOLS ARE NOT
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS
Andrew P. Morriss*
ABSTRACT
This term the Supreme Court will confront the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, which mandates equal access for military recruiters at universities that
accept federal funding. The Third Circuit previously held the statute unconstitu-
tional. This Article argues that the Court should reverse and uphold the statute
because the lower court failed to consider the cartelized nature of legal education
and so assumed that law schools are "expressive associations" entitled to assert First
Amendment claims; the court also failed to give proper deference to Congress's
exercise of its Article I power to raise and support armies and over-valued law
faculties' interest in career services offices.
INTRODUCTION
This term the Supreme Court will consider whether Congress may constitutionally
require law schools that accept federal funds (or that are part of universities which do
so) to allow military recruiters the same access to the law schools' career services
offices that the schools provide to other employers.' The answer is straightforward:
* Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law & Regulation and Director, Center for
Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve School of Law. A.B. Princeton University,
1981; J.D., M.Pub.Aff., The University of Texas at Austin, 1984; Ph.D. (Economics),
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. Thanks to Jonathan H. Adler, William T.
Bogart, Benjamin Cramer, George Dent, Richard Epstein, Amos Guiora, William Marshall,
Robert G. Natelson, Dan Polsby, Dan Roth, Stefani Smith, Nathaniel Stewart, the other
panelists and the audience at the 2005 Southeastern Association of Law Schools meeting in
Hilton Head, South Carolina, the audience and panelists at the Boston College symposium
on the issue in November 2005, participants at The University of Pennsylvania debate co-
sponsored by the Federalist Society chapter and the Lambda Legal Alliance, and several
reviewers who preferred to remain anonymous for comments and critiques, and to Chaya
Compton for excellent research assistance. All opinions expressed herein are, of course, my
own; the sensitive nature of this topic requires me to state expressly that those who
commented on this draft did so without any implication of their own views as to the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, or law
faculties' appropriate role in university governance.
1 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
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Yes. In Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld 2 (hereinafter
"FAIR v. Rumsfeld"), a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that the federal statute, known as the "Solomon Amendment,"3 that
imposes this choice on universities violated the First Amendment rights of law
schools. Some law schools wish to deny access to military recruiters because the
Congressional "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on openly homosexual members of
the military violates the law schools' antidiscrimination policies.4 The Third
Circuit's conclusion was incorrect and should be reversed.5
The purpose of this Article is to identify three problems with the Third Circuit
panel's analysis in FAIR v. Rumsfeld- problems which should lead the Supreme
Court to reverse the decision and uphold the Solomon Amendment.6 First, the Third
Circuit improperly treated the law schools and law faculties as if they were
independent entities entitled to assert associational freedom claims. They are not.
Second, the Third Circuit undervalued the government's interest by failing to give
sufficient deference to Congress's power to raise and support the armed forces.7
Proper deference to Congress's decision on how to recruit military lawyers changes
the result. Third, the Third Circuit overvalued the law schools' and law faculties'
interests by misunderstanding the nature of legal education and the impact of the
Solomon Amendment on it. A correct understanding of these issues compels a
result opposite to the one reached by the appeals court. However, any one of these
grounds is sufficient to reverse the Third Circuit's opinion. Together they make a
compelling case against FAIR.
Section I briefly discusses the background necessary for these legal arguments.
The structure of the market for legal education is critical to the proper understanding
of the associational status of law schools and to the appropriate weighing of the
government's and law schools' interests. I therefore provide a brief summary of
the relevant market characteristics. Relatively few of the details of the Solomon
Amendment or the underlying "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on homosexuality and
the military are relevant to the constitutional issues. The Third Circuit opinion focused
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (May 2, 2005) (No. 04-1152).
2 Id.
10 U.S.C.A. § 983(b) (West Supp. 2005).
" See infra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
s Additional arguments about why the Third Circuit decision should be reversed are
made in an amicus brief in which I participated. Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors &
Law Students in Support of Petitioners, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (No. 04-
1152), 2005 WL 1707459 [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Law Professors and Law Students].
6 In addition, through some fairly sharp words, this Article aims to puncture some of the
over-inflated rhetoric emanating from FAIR and move the discussion to a more realistic
level.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 ("To raise and support Armies"); id. cl. 13 ("To provide
and maintain a Navy"); id. cl. 14 ("To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces").
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on irrelevant aspects of each, however, and so I briefly describe the constitutionally
relevant aspects of both. Parts II-IV set out the three critiques of the Third Circuit's
opinion listed above. Part V concludes.
I. LAW SCHOOLS, THE MILITARY'S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY, AND THE
SOLOMON AMENDMENT
The clash between the plaintiff law schools and law faculties and the military
over the Solomon Amendment is well known and needs only to be briefly
summarized to emphasize the points critical to the argument below. (I refer the
reader to the multitude of law review articles8 and both parties' thorough factual
sections in their briefs and other pleadings9 for a more complete account of the
background.) What has not been described in the earlier literature, however, is the
structure of the market in legal education. There are important implications of that
market structure for the FAIR plaintiffs' ability to assert associational freedom
claims. There are also implications for the proper weighing of the interests of both
the government and the law schools and law faculties. This section provides the
crucial context necessary to resolve the constitutionality of the Solomon Amend-
ment.
A. Law Schools and Legal Education
Legal education must be considered as a business.' ° There are an astounding
number of law schools issuing J.D. degrees in the United States today (190 American
8 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom ofSolomon: The First
Amendment and Military Recruitment on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY B1LLRTs. J. 205 (2004);
Robin Ingli, Gays in the Military: A Policy Analysis of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the
Solomon Amendment, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 89 (1998); Lindsay Gayle Stevenson,
Note, Military Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
and the Solomon Amendment, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1331 (2004).
9 See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at t 19-41, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)); Memorandum of Law in Support ofDefendants'
Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 4,
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (No. 03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)).
"0 See Richard A. Matasar, The Two Professionalisms of Legal Education, 15 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 99, 103 (2001) (stating that business and legal education
"are inextricably linked. Simply put: [the dean's] job is running a business."). See also
Richard A. Matasar, A Commercialist Manifesto: Entrepreneurs, Academics, and Purity of
the Heart and Soul, 48 FLA. L. REv. 781 (1996). Dean Matasar, now at New York Law
School, is one of the most perceptive commentators on the business of legal education; he
is also a participant in FAIR. See Declaration of Richard Matasar, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291
F. Supp, 2d 269 (D.N.J. 2003) (03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)), available at http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/solomon/Documents/Matasar.pdf (last visited August 5, 2005).
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Bar Association-accredited law schools, including seven provisionally accredited,"
and additional unaccredited law schools 2), and the number continues to grow.' 3
Even more astounding than the number of law schools, however, is the remarkable
lack of diversity of approaches to teaching among law schools. 4 Indeed, the pri-
mary differences in educational approaches from one American law school to the
next seem to lie in the number of required courses and the availability of particular
elective courses.' 5 This uniformity is particularly striking in the organization of the
law schools: schools that dominate the field are staffed by full-time faculty with
relatively light teaching loads (compared to other sectors of higher education), place
an emphasis on faculty scholarship,' 6 and encourage full-time study by students. 7
" ABA-Approved Law Schools, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/
approved.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). In addition, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate
General's School is accredited to offer a graduate degree.
2 California, the largest market for unaccredited law schools, has nineteen accredited by
the California Committee ofBar Examiners and twelve completely unaccredited law schools.
The Princeton Review, What You ShouldKnowAboutLaw SchoolAccreditation, http://www.
princetonreview.com/law/research/articles/find/accreditation.asp (last visited Sept. 13,2005).
'" The number of law schools listed in the ABA's Guide to Legal Education has grown
from 145 in 1969 to 190 today. See ABA-Approved Law Schools By Year Approved, http:/
www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/year.html.
14 See Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests andPublic Values, 34
IND. L. REV. 23, 28 (2000) ("Greater diversity in legal education would also permit greater
diversity in the legal profession and in the career paths of its members."), This lack of
diversity is all the more striking given the major changes in the legal profession over the past
century. See also Herb D. Vest, Felling the Giant: Breaking the ABA 's Stranglehold on Legal
Education in America, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 494, 497-501 (2000) (attacking ABA accredi-
tation requirements and written by a graduate of an unaccredited law school).
"5 See, e.g., Lawrence C. Foster, The Impact ofthe Close Relationship Between American
Law Schools and the Practicing Bar, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 346, 347 (2001) ("The first-year
curriculum is nearly identical at all American law schools: legal writing and research,
contract law, property law, criminal law, torts, and civil procedure, with some law schools
also introducing aspects of constitutional law. In the second and third year, most courses are
elective.").
16 Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model ofLegal Teaching and Scholarship, 40 AM.
U. L. REv. 367, 373 (1990) ("It is currently the common wisdom that tenure and promotion
are attainable at most law schools by faculty who have compiled a record of solid published
scholarship coupled with classroom teaching that does not provoke active complaints from
students.").
'7 See Rhode, supra note 14, at 26.
In a New York Times Magazine profile, one faculty member put the
point bluntly: whatever its other faults, "law school works pretty well
for us." On average, legal academics earn the highest salaries of all
university faculty. And the accreditation process protects key aspects
of their quality of life, such as tenure, teaching loads, and research
support.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The critical point is this: the legal education market is not a competitive market.
The lack of competition should make courts skeptical of the behavior of what gives
every appearance of being a cartel.
1. Law Schools' Market Power
Most American law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association
(ABA).' 8 Accreditation allows law school graduates to take the bar in most U.S.
states and requires the law schools to adopt a series of policies that reduce
competition.' 9 Most are also members of the American Association of Law Schools
(AALS) (166 of the 190 ABA-accredited schools).2° Membership in the AALS
gives privileged access to a variety of AALS services and is a mark of prestige;
however, in Professor Harry First's memorable summary, "AALS membership is
no more than a designer label that gives a school (as one group of past AALS
presidents put it) 'an intangible Je-ne-sais-quoi sort of cachet.' 21 The real key to
the AALS's role is its influence on the accreditation process.22
"8 See ABA-Approved Law Schools, supra note 11.
'9 Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (I), 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311,
327-28 (1978) [hereinafter First, Competition 1].
20 What is the AALS?, http://www.aals.org/about.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2005). The
AALS was formed in 1900 by twenty-five "reputable" law schools in response to a call from
the ABA for the creation of an organization to lobby for "academic lawyers." ROBERT
STEvENs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s
96-97 (1983). Stevens describes the AALS as consisting of "the elite law schools, who
dreamed of the day when all but the full-time university-affiliated law schools would have
gone the way of the proprietary medical schools." Id. at 116.
21 Harry First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (II): An Antitrust Analysis,
54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1049, 1072-73 (1979) (citation omitted) [hereinafter First, Competition
11] (describing how an AALS membership is a valuable asset that gives a school prestige and
is helpful in attracting students and faculty). First also notes that "there are no real
substantive differences between ABA and AALS standards." Id, at 1072-73. First summarizes
the 1967 AALS presidential address of Wex Malone as follows:
[T]he AALS envisioned itself "as a club of the relatively select, the
more prestigious, the higher quality schools," whose standards and
ambitions were rapidly escalating. In view of the increasing number of
applicants, quality law schools could afford to "skim off the cream,
select the best[,] leaving the rejected ones with only the prospect of
admission somewhere else." The rejected ones, it was suggested, would
become the "legal mechanics," not "drawn from the intellectual elite,"
who could handle "the oft recurrent problems of simple people with
limited funds."
Id. at 1056 (citations omitted).
22 Accreditation teams for AALS member schools include an AALS member who works
with the ABA team members. Am. Bar Ass'n Sec. ofLegal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar,
Overview ofthe ABA Accreditation andSite Visit Process and Memorandum Concerning the
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The ABA and the AALS have long worked together 3 to implement a particular
model of legal education, which Professor First labels the elitist-preference model,
and to exclude competition from other models of legal education.24 Somewhat more
colorfully, Dean Edward Lee of the then unaccredited John Marshall Law School
in Chicago alleged in 1924 that this cooperative relationship was the product of a
"group of educational racketeers."2 To take but one example, the ABA limits the
use of adjunct faculty through its standard for student-faculty ratios and a definition
of "faculty" that includes only full-time faculty.26 In short, as Professor George
Shepherd notes, "[t]he ABA forces one style of law training, at Rolls-Royce prices. 27
This precludes schools like the Massachusetts School of Law, which emphasizes prac-
tical legal training rather than academic analysis of the law,28 from being accredited.29
Conduct ofthe Site Visit (2004), at 5, available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/accreditation/
conductmemo2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2005).
23 The partnership has not always been without conflict. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note
20, at 98-99 (describing differences over elimination of diploma privilege); Donna Fossum,
Law School Accreditation Standards and the Structure ofAmerican Legal Education, 1978
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 515, 518 (1978) (discussing disagreements within the ABA over a
campaign against part-time, proprietary schools).
24 First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 332 ("Predicted anticompetitive conduct, organ-
ized by the AALS, has been rampant for more than seventy years. Finally, restrictions on
output, lack of innovation, and uniformity - again predicted by applying our economic
model to legal education - have successfully been sought."); id. at 342-43 ("[T]he AALS
became, like many trade associations, a 'bureau of standards.' Mandatory uniform standards,
it was believed, would make the AALS 'more potent in effecting standardization than a mere
open forum without standards or responsibility' could be." (citations omitted)); Vest, supra
note 14, at 496.
In response to the swelling ranks of lawyers and the perceived
competition from new schools, the ABA teamed up with the Association
of American Law Schools to lobby state legislatures and supreme courts
to begin requiring graduation from an ABA-approved law school in
order to gain admission to the state bars.
Id. Professor First notes that this conduct is relatively easy to observe because
[t]he legal education industry, unlike other businesses, has been
operated on the assumption that it is outside the reach of the Sherman
Act. One might therefore expect cartel behavior to be visible rather
than suppressed, and collusion to be express rather than tacit. Our study
of the industry will bear out these expectations.
First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 331 (citations omitted).
2 STEVENS, supra note 20, at 175.
26 Am. Bar Ass'n, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS 2004-2005, at 16, 33-35 (2004) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL].
27 George B. Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism
of the ABA's Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 105 (2003).
28 See Message from Dean Velvel, http://www.mslaw.edu/dean-Message.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2005) (describing MSL's approach to legal education).
29 See Peter James Kolovos, AntitrustLaw andNonprofit Organizations: The Law School
Accreditation Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 689-90 (1996) (describing MSL approach and
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It also has a devastating impact on the access to legal education by poor and
minority prospective students.3a
Of course, the ABA offers justifications for individual ABA accreditation rules
connected to concerns about professionalism and educational quality.3' It is difficult
however, to defend the ABA standards individually or in aggregate on these
grounds.32 Again, consider a single example: ABA standards require law schools
to make a substantial investment in hard-copy volumes for their libraries.33 Modem
legal research is largely done electronically. 34 It is hard to conceive of the library
standards as anything other than a substantial barrier to entry for any firm consid-
ering expanding into legal education.35
its failed attempt to obtain accreditation).
30 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 134.
By imposing high costs, the system has closed the legal profession to
most people with lower incomes. Because black families have lower
incomes and less wealth than most other groups, the high entry price
that the ABA imposes is a filter, like the academic accreditation require-
ments, for eliminating blacks from the legal profession.
Id. See also STEVENS, supra note 20, at 195 ("Legal education - as one of the by-products
of rising standards [in the early twentieth century] - was moving out of the reach of
minorities....").
3' For an uncritical statement of the case for ABA standards, see Kolovos, supra note 29,
at 698-702. Stevens argues that "the motives behind raising standards were numerous" -
not simply the economic and anti-immigrant ones proposed by Professor First and others.
STEVENS, supra note 20, at 100. He concedes, however, that "wherever one looks in the
literature of the period, the establishment expressed concern about the background of those
who were alleged to be demeaning the bar." Id. at 101.
32 See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 27, at 107 (arguing that "the ABA's rigid forms of
accreditation and the bar exam may have caused malpractice and fraud to be more frequent
in law than in other fields."); id. at 110 ("Although the ABA asserted that tough bar exams
and accreditation were necessary for consumer protection, the calls for consumer protection
came only when many new minority lawyers were beginning to compete effectively with the
ABA's members."); see also Fossum, supra note 23, at 541 (calling for a thorough validation
study of ABA standards after concluding that existing evidence was inadequate).
" STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL, supra note 26, at 46-47. Professor Shepherd reports that
"[t]he ABA requires a minimum expenditure on library operations and acquisitions of about
$1 million per year. One head law librarian and member of many accreditation teams
indicated that $1 million was the minimum, not including the cost of overhead for the library
building and of computer technology." Shepherd, supra note 27, at 132-33. Professor
Shepherd calculated the average cost per student of complying with this standard was more
than $4,000 in 1999 based on spending by recently accredited schools. Id. at 133.
14 See, e.g., Catherine Sanders Reach, David Whelan, & Molly Flood, Feasibility and
Viability of the Digital Library in a Private Law Firm, 95 LAw LMR. J. 369 (2003) (describ-
ing the potential for electronic legal research to replace print research, reporting survey
evidence that shows possibility is both feasible and viable, and determining that barriers are
largely non-technical).
3' First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 331; see also First, Competition II, supra note
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The ABA and the AALS go beyond straightforward criteria such as the library
rules; both prescribe elaborate and vague sets of requirements a school must meet to
be accredited (the ABA)36 or to be a member (the AALS). 37 The combination of ABA
accreditation and AALS membership commits the school to a number of "elitist-
preference" strategies."a Professor First concluded in 1978 that "[t]he mechanism of
industry self-regulation erected in the 1920's remains solidly intact today, and it oper-
ates to protect law schools from competition. The partners in regulation, the AALS
and the ABA, work closely together."39 Moreover, he found that:
the long-term effect of private industry regulation has been neg-
ative. Output has been restrained; new schools face significant
entry barriers; innovation has been discouraged. The regulatory
mechanism, on the other hand, has actually been strengthened
since 1963, and the AALS and ABA together keep a firm grip
on the industry.4 °
Although the analysis by Professor First on which much of the above discussion is
based was completed in the 1970s, others have reached similar conclusions more
recently.41
21, at 1053-54 (describing costs of joining for new schools: the 1965 AALS Guideline
Statement on the Establishment of New Law Schools set out the criteria for new member
schools, which included more than $1,000,000 in capital costs, excluding land costs, $50,000
per year in book costs, three full-time library staff, a requirement to pay "average or median
salary for comparable schools" for a predominantly full-time faculty, and more than
$480,000 in start up non-capital costs).
36 The process for ABA accreditation takes at least three years (including a "provisional
accreditation" period). During this time, the ABA determines if the law school is "consistent
with sound legal education principles" by adhering to the ABA Standards for Approval.
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL, supra note 26, at 9, 11. Even the ABA's fans concede these
standards are "a complex set of standards dealing with a wide range of issues." Foster, supra
note 15, at 346. Somewhat remarkably, in 1973 the ABA deleted the precise interpretations
of its standards from the official publication, meaning that "the actual meanings of the
standards were no longer ascertainable from their language alone." Fossum, supra note 23,
at 521, n.26. The interpretations were published separately several years later. Id.
37 Even though the AALS has accreditation requirements separate from the ABA, see
Association of American Law Schools, Bylaws of the AALS (2004), the ABA and the AALS
have similar goals and interests. At times, the same AALS accreditation personnel are also
ABA accreditation personnel, which has created accusations of a conspiracy between the two
associations. See Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. ABA, 142 F.3d. 26 (1st Cir. 1998).
38 First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 329. "Elitist-preference" strategies are features
of legal education that structure it to benefit law faculties at the expense of law students and
other interests. They are described in more detail in note 41 and accompanying text.
3' First, Competition II, supra note 21, at 1078.
40 Id. at 1088.
"' See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, So, Why Do You Want to be a Lawyer? What the ABA, the
AALS, and U.S. News Don't Know That We Do, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 573, 576 (2000) (former
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The ABA-AALS alliance was remarkably successful in implementing its
preferred model of legal education. By 1958, only eight percent of law students
were not in ABA-approved schools; 42 66 percent had been in AALS-unapproved
schools in 1928."3 The transition to an elitist-preference model of legal education has
had important impacts on legal education. For example, the AALS-ABA attempts
to "improve" law schools have introduced serious ethnic and class biases into legal
education,' biases which remain today.45 Legal education is regularly criticized by
dean of Boston University Law School noting that "[b]oth accrediting organizations [ABA
and AALS] have pushed hardto make U.S. legal education more homogeneous, to encourage
schools to focus on inputs, and to divert resources from their best uses for legal education.");
John S. Elson, The Governmental Maintenance of the Privilege ofLegal Academia: A Case
Study in Classic Rent-Seeking and a Challenge to Our Democratic Ideology, 15 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 269 (2001).
The primary reason American legal education so effectively entrenches
the wealthy and denies access to the non-wealthy is that it operates as
a rent-seeking cartel which in its essential aspects acts just like other
industry cartels that use governmental restrictions on market entry in
order to boost their members' profits.
Id. at 270. George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accredi-
tation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091 (1998).
Many of the participants in the accreditation system are public-spirited
and selfless. However, economic analysis leads us to conclude
reluctantly that the system has imposed large harms. Existing law
faculty have gained, on balance, at the expense of their students, of
their universities, and of other potential faculty members to whom the
system denies teaching jobs. By suppressing potential new schools that
would offer cheaper, more-efficient legal education, the system has
excluded many from the legal profession, particularly the poor and
minorities. It has raised the cost of legal services. And it has, in effect,
denied legal services to whole segments of our society.
Id. at 2094.
42 STEVENS, supra note 20, at 207. For additional figures see Fossum, supra note 23, at
523.
43 STEVENS, supra note 20, at 174. Over a bit longer period, law school revenues soared:
from $17 million in 1948 to $275 million in 1976, an almost seven-fold increase in real
dollars. Id. at 235. The hypothesis that the two changes are related is one that springs
immediately to mind.
4 Robert W. Gordon, The Case For (and Against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1231,
1241 (1995) (reviewing WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF
MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION (1994)) (stating that development of the elitist-
preference model law schools was a "godsend" for an elite bar seeking to "redeem them-
selves from complicity in the piratical practices of some of their business clients and in part
to distinguish themselves as a meritocratic caste from both new-wealth businessmen and
from what they perceived to be the - increasingly immigrant - riffraff of the profession").
4' First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 362-63; Shepherd, supra note 27, at 106
(terming ABA accreditation "a deeply discriminatory system with roots in a racist past").
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the bar for failing to adequately train lawyers in the practice of law.46 ABA
accreditation standards prevent alternative methods of legal education, such as corres-
pondence schools47 and many part-time programs.48
The point is not whether the elitist-preference model of legal education is better
than any particular alternative. The point is simply that the lack of deviation from
the ABA- and AALS-endorsed model of legal education is not the result of a
competitive market for legal education.49 This cartel behavior allows those who
control law schools to engage in what economists term "rent-seeking." 50 That such
46 See, e.g., ABA Sec. of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and
Professional Development-An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992). See also Rhode, supra note 14, at
36 ("Law schools claim, above all else, to teach students how to 'think like a lawyer.' In fact,
they often teach students how to think like a law professor, in a form distanced and detached
from human contexts.").
41 See, e.g., Vest, supra note 14, at 501 (discussing Concord School of Law, a corre-
spondence school).
48 See, e.g., In re Laclede Sch. of Law, 700 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1985) (denying state accredi-
tation to only school offering evening legal education in Missouri).
'9 First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 343-47. The AALS adopted a host of require-
ments that brought schools into the elitist preference model: restrictions on night schools, the
requirement of pre-professional education, the ban on proprietary schools, and the full-time
faculty requirement. As Professor First summarized:
The elite-model law school will thus seek market control, just as a
profit-maximizing firm would, following strategies that can increase
the intensity of demand for its product and decrease the elasticity of
demand. Like the classical business firm, too, the law school will
restrict output. But rather than raising its price, it will keep its price at
the minimum level that satisfies its revenue constraint. Demand will
exceed supply at the, price charged, so that the law school can then
satisfy its nonmonetary elitist preference for the "brightest" students.
At that price/output level, the school will also be less subject to
economic pressure - thus satisfying another elitist preference - since
there will always be a comfortable excess in the number of customers.
The hypothesized firm, therefore, should follow traditional economic
strategies, but for the purpose of freeing itself from economic
discipline. Rather than profit, the law school firm seeks freedom.
Id. at 325-26 (citations omitted).
'o See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 373 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed.
1992) (defining rent seeking as "[t]he use of real resources in an attempt to appropriate a
surplus in the form of a rent"). Robert Stevens's history of legal education opens by noting
that:
[t]he leading American law schools appear to have an entrenched
position ofpower in the profession, in academic life, and, indeed, in the
country at large, a position that is frequently denied to the academic
branches of the profession in other industrialized societies .... Law
professors within the university appear to live something of a charmed
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rent-seeking has occurred seems indisputable - the former ABA standards on
faculty salaries and the practice of sharing salary data among accredited law schools,
eliminated after the Justice Department brought a civil antitrust action against the
ABA, prove the point.5 Similarly, the library standards, "a wish list for faculty and
law librarians" financed by students or state subsidies, are a clear instance of
indulging faculty preferences at a substantial cost.52 We, and the courts, thus have
reason to be skeptical of the FAIR plaintiffs' rhetoric and the cloaking of their actions
in academic justifications. More importantly for consideration of the Solomon
Amendment, because ABA-accredited law schools have a chokehold on American
legal education, they have an equally vigorous grip on law graduates' post-graduate
employment opportunities.53
2. The Structure of the Market for Law Graduates
The second aspect of the market structure which is important to consider in the
FAIR plaintiffs' claims is the structure of the job market for new law school
graduates. The crux of the dispute between Congress and the FAIR plaintiffs is
access to law schools' on-campus career services offices. Although all ABA-
accredited law school graduates potentially have access to a national job market (via
their eligibility for various states' bar exams),54 in practice many legal employers
life.
STEVENS, supra note 20, at xiii.
"' Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,766 (Dec. 12, 1995); United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n: Proposed
Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,421 (Aug. 2, 1995). The
former ABA Standard 405(a) provided that accredited law schools had to offer faculty
salaries "reasonably related to the prevailing compensation of comparably qualified private
practitioners and government attorneys and of the judiciary [and] comparable with that paid
[law school] faculty members ... in the same general geographical area." Kolovos, supra
note 29, at 721 n. 177. The salary standard was defended on the ground that it helped attract
"high-quality faculty" from the private sector. Id. at 721. Market pressures are so self-
evidently capable of accomplishing this that the justification is patently ridiculous. If the
ABA directly regulated faculty quality, for example, it would force law schools to pay
whatever salaries were necessary to recruit sufficient quality faculty to maintain their
accreditation. Of course, that would require the ABA to articulate what constituted "quality"
faculty, something that might prove controversial, and would not require awarding salary
increases to existing faculty.
52 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 132.
13 Indeed, they have a grip on JAG Corps opportunities generally. See, e.g., The Official
Web Site of the United States Navy JAG, FAQS, http://www.jag.navy.mil/Careers/Careers
FAQ3.htm (last visited August 5, 2005) (stating that student program applicants "must be
attending a law school approved by the ABA").
" Twenty-two of the fifty states limit the bar exam to those who have graduated from an
ABA-accredited law school. Ten more allow graduates of unaccredited schools to take the
bar only if they have practiced for several years already, effectively barring new graduates
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hire primarily through a process that includes an on-campus interview component.55
Law schools are required by an ABA standard adopted in the 1970s to provide an
"active" placement effort. 6
Law school applicants care quite a bit about law schools' ability to deliver
employers to the on-campus program57 and access to different types of legal jobs
from unaccredited schools. Seven more limit the bar to graduates from unaccredited schools
approved by the state. Seven allow law office study for a specified number of years in
addition to graduation from an ABA-accredited school. Thus, for first time bar takers
graduating from a law school, thirty-four of the fifty-one jurisdictions (including D.C.)
effectively require either an ABA-accredited school or a state-approved school. Only grad-
uation from an ABA-accredited school permits one to take the bar in all fifty-one juris-
dictions. AM. BAR ASS'N, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2004,
at 10-13 Chart III (2004).
" For a thorough discussion ofthe hiring process, which explains the role and importance
of the on-campus process and law schools' strong bargaining position in setting the terms of
the process, see Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The MarketforElite Law FirmAssociates,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 909 (2004).
Offices of career services have become a crucial component of a law
school as pressures to place students in high-paying law firms have
increased. The placement rate for students is a component of the
influential US. News & World Report ranking system, which has sig-
nificantly modified internal aspects of law school organization. One
component of this has been greater pressure on schools to devote
resources to placing students.
Id. at 922 (citation omitted). Additional useful discussion of the hiring process is given in
David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, What Law Students Think They Know About Elite Law
Firms: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Third Year Law Students, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1213
(2001). See also Abbie Willard Thomer, Legal Education in the Recruitment Marketplace:
Decades of Change, 1987 DUKE L.J. 276 (1987).
Employers of all sizes and types vie for the best and brightest in the
second- and third-year classes of law schools across the nation. No
longer is on-campus law school recruiting the domain solely of the
large firm or government agency. Within the last decade, medium and
smaller firms, public interest organizations, corporations, and busi-
nesses have arranged interview dates nine to twelve months in advance
of law students' employment availability. More and more employers
are requesting interviews with or direct contact from students at law
schools of all sizes, geographic locations, and reputations.
Id. at 280.
56 See John D. Feerick, Job-Placement Services Needed in Law Schools, NAT'L. L.J.
(Dec. 31, 1984) at 24 (quoting 1978 standard); see also STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL, supra
note 26, at 44.
"7 Feerick, supra note 56, at 24 (stating that the placement office "is increasingly
responsible for helping to attract students to law schools"). Placement offices are a relatively
new development; as late as the early 1970s, there were only about twenty-five at law schools.
Id.
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through these programs varies dramatically across law schools.5 8 For example, Am
Law 20059 law firms' participation in on-campus interview programs significantly
favors the law schools ranked highest in the U.S. News & World Report rankings of
legal education.6" In this and other ways, the elite schools offer their graduates
much greater opportunities for highly desirable jobs with these firms,6 1 and that
access is one of the key factors which distinguish elite law schools from their
competitors in prospective students' eyes. It would not be unreasonable to view
these schools' provision to their students of the extraordinarily valuable access to
Am Law 200 employers as a key component of the composite "legal education
good" they sell to the students. It is implausible, however, that the desired
characteristic being sold is the faculty's review of the employers involved for
compliance with the faculty's preferences about appropriate employers.
Indeed, the elite law schools' market power within legal education is sub-
stantial.62 They control access to the "best" law students,63 a desirable group of
recruits for law firms and other legal employers, and also offer students the most
opportunities for access to the "best" jobs, as measured by salary or firm prestige in
the private sector and prestige in the public sector (including access to the most
prestigious judicial clerkships). In an economic sense, the top strata of American
58 William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT
Scores: Migration Patterns in the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163, 176-200
(2005); see also Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Delivering
Legality or Solving Problems, 64 IND. L.J. 433 (1989).
[N]o law school would define educational success solely according to
the market as reflected in the starting salaries of its graduates. Law
schools do, however, like to report salary figures as well as the
percentage of students with jobs at graduation, the number of firms
who come to the school to recruit, and the number of places where
students go to practice, and all of those figures relate directly to
recruiting by the large law firms.
Id. at 433 n.3.
'9 "Am Law 200" firms are those listed in the American Lawtyer magazine survey of the
top 200 law firms.
60 Henderson & Morriss, supra note 58, at 189. Other important factors include the
location of the school in an area where a firm has an office and the percentage of minority
students enrolled in a school. Id. at 189-90.
61 Id.
62 Id.; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Information Production andRent-Seeking in Law School
Administration: Rules andDiscretion, 83 B.U.L. REv. 1141, 1145-46 (2003) ("Harvard Law
School could double tuition, or give all students 'A's,' or double the average class size to
reduce faculty teaching loads without fear of losing many students to schools outside the 'top
10."').
63 Assuming "best" means highest entering credentials, based largely on LSAT scores
and undergraduate GPAs.
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law schools thus operate an employment matching service, bringing together the
"best" students and "best" employers. 64
Participation in on-campus interviewing at these top schools is valuable for legal
employers, as can be seen by the disproportionate number of Am Law 200 firms
conducting such interviews at the top sixteen and top fifty law schools (as ranked
by U.S. News) compared to lower ranked schools.65 We thus have strong revealed
preference evidence that access to on-campus interviewing is valuable for legal em-
ployers, particularly at the "best" schools, and that students highly value access to
employers in selecting which law school to attend. 66 This is important information,
for both FAIR and the Third Circuit disparaged the usefulness of on-campus
interviewing for the military.
67
6 See Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordination
and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REv. 403 (1998) (arguing that U.S. News rank-
ings have facilitated this function).
6' Henderson & Morriss, supra note 58, at 189-90.
66 Law schools certainly seem to think so, for they regularly tout the number and variety
of employers who visit their on-campus recruiting programs. See, e.g., Vanderbilt University
Law School Career Services, http://law.vanderbilt.edu/career ("Employers from nearly 550
offices, representing 30 states, come to Vanderbilt's campus each fall. In addition to on-
campus interviews, hundreds of legal employers annually solicit letters of interest and
resumes from our students."); Cornell Law School Career Services, http://www.lawschool.
comell.edu/admissions/careerservices ("Our reputation for producing high-caliber lawyers
makes our graduates some of the most heavily recruited in the country."); Wayne State
University Law School Career Services, http://www.bulletins.wayne.edu/gbk-output/law7.
html ("During several weeks in the fall, and again in the spring, the office coordinates on-
campus interviews with over 100 employers."); Yale Law School Career Development
Office, http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/htm/CareerDevelopment/cdo-jdfip2005.htm ("Hun-
dreds of employers are already registered for [the Fall Interview Program]."); Recruiting at
Boston College Law School, http://www.bc.edu/schools/law/meta-elements/pdf/recruiting
05.pdf ("Last year several hundred employers visited Boston College Law School and con-
ducted over 3,700 interviews for summer and permanent positions."); Feerick, supra note 56,
at 29 ("Judging from the material that passes over a dean's desk every day, law schools
increasingly are referring to their placement programs in their fund-raising appeals to alumni
and their promotional literature to prospective students."). Career services professionals also
stress the importance ofthe OCI process. See, e.g., Sandra L. Mans, Your Law School Career
Services Offices -An Effective Way to Hire, 70 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32 (1998).
If an employer has lead time one of the most cost-effective and time-
efficient ways to hire is to interview on-campus (i.e., a scheduled visit
to the law school) .... A benefit of on-campus interviewing is that
employers receive first-class treatment and most find the interview day
to be a pleasant experience.
Id. at 32.
67 Reply Brief for Appellants at 24, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No.
03-4433).
Under the Solomon Amendment, a school could grant military
recruiters access to campus, but require them [sic] set up their tables
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Why might on-campus interviewing be useful to the military? Economic logic
provides a rationale. There are three groups of students in any law school (and
membership in any of them will range from 0-100 percent of the student body):
those definitely interested in careers in the military, those definitely not interested,
and those without a firm opinion. The first group will certainly seek out military
recruiters regardless of the existence of an on-campus interview program; the second
group will not even if the on-campus program is present. The military's interest lies
with the third group. For those without a definitive opinion about a military law
career, locating an interview program on-campus lowers the cost of acquiring more
information about the military and military legal careers. There are thus likely to
be some students who will attend an on-campus program (because the cost is low)
with a military recruiter who won't attend an off-campus program (because the cost
in time and effort is higher). If the military is not simply looking for a fixed number
of bodies but has an interest in maximizing the overall quality of its lawyers, as it
surely does, increasing the size of the pool of potential recruits serves the military's
recruitment interest.
68
Even if we take at face value the FAIR plaintiffs' claim that law schools' and
law faculties' control of participation in their on-campus interview programs6 9 is
just inside the campus gates. Without the Solomon Amendment, the
recruiters could set up their tables just outside the campus gates.
Neither Congress nor the District Court had before it any evidence that
the former would be more effective than the latter, much less that it
would be so much more effective as to justify the trammeling of the
rights of a few resisting institutions.
Id. See also FAIR, 390 F.3d at 235 ("[N]ot only might other methods of recruitment yield
acceptable results, they might actually fare better than the current system.").
68 This brings us quite directly back to the inconvenient language in the Constitution
about "raising and supporting" the military forces. See supra note 7.
69 Curiously, the AALS policy does not prohibit career services offices' complicity in
discriminatory recruiting entirely (law schools routinely provide transcripts for military
employers, for example). Nor do the standards require any attempt to verify employers'
compliance with the signed policy. See infra notes 231-33 and accompanying text. The
AALS and faculty interest in career services offices is comparatively recent. In a briefhistory
ofplacement efforts, one law school career placement official noted that "[o]nce upon a time,
law schools were in the business of educating and training new lawyers. Period. Before the
early 1960's, few law schools devoted significant attention to precise admission criteria. At
the other end of the legal education process, few schools devoted much attention to job
placement." Thomer, supra note 55, at 276 (citation omitted). As Dean Thorner notes, it was
the boom in law school attendance in the 1970s that made the law school career services
offices become important parts of getting a job, id. at 277, a boom that allowed law schools
to exploit their oligopolistic position. Interestingly, in the mid-1980s the president of the
AALS did not seem to be aware of the vital educational purpose of career services oper-
ations. Professor Roger Crampton, then-AALS president, wrote in 1985 that "[l]aw placement
as a whole is now an engine totally out of anyone's control, a market response to the cumu-
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"about the freedom of law schools to shape their own pedagogical environments
and to teach, by word and deed, the values they choose, free from government
intrusion,"7 we can see that this is at best an incomplete statement of the role of law
school career services offices.71 Law students have interests in the operation of this
matching service which are independent of law faculties' interests; this is, after all,
where many law students will find their firstjobs. Students in the undecided group
have an interest in having the maximum range of potential employers present on
campus. Legal employers, including the government, also have an interest in the
operation of this job market. Indeed, the federal and various state governments
already heavily regulate the operation of law schools' career services offices through
educational privacy,72 antidiscrimination, and other employment-regulatory laws.
Any interest of law faculties or law schools in the operation of career services
offices is thus already heavily circumscribed by public interests (as expressed in
regulatory statutes) - in short, there is a great deal of government intrusion already
going on. Viewed in this light, the Solomon Amendment is just one of many
government intrusions into the operation of the law schools' career services
offices.73 This suggests that what we must be concerned with is the marginal impact
of this final regulatory constraint on law schools' career services offices, an impact
that is far smaller than the marginal impact of a host of other extant regulations.74
lative actions of thousands of legal employers and job candidates, with law schools as the
intermediaries and the education program as the victim." Id. at 280 n.6 (quoting Roger
Cramton, President's Message on Improving Student Placement, AALS NEWSL., Sept. 1985,
at 2).
70 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1,
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03 Civ. 4433 (JCL)) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Trial Brief]. FAIR's members were notably silent in the debate over whether Bob
Jones University got to do this. It didn't. Consider also the position of most law school
faculties on the ranking of students by GPA. My own experience suggests that class rank is
primarily provided by law schools as a service to large law firms, who desire a quick means
of sorting prospective hires. Ranking students solely on the basis of grades certainly sends
an effective message to law firms and law students alike. It also seems strikingly inconsistent
with the sort of message FAIR's members endorse. This sort of craven caving-in to market
pressures exerted by large law firms serving primarily elite clients, as most law schools do,
is almost enough to make one suspect that the message FAIR wishes to send has less to do
with discrimination and more to do with the employer in question.
"' Note too that the ABA bars academic credit for CSO activities. See infra note 241.
72 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2004).
" Perhaps FAIR's members simply do not object to these other statutes. Presumably they
like Title VII, for example. Their position begins to sound suspiciously unprincipled,
however, when they fail to stand up for the universities, colleges, law schools, and other
institutions that might object to such standards. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
74 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1988) (holding
that privacy interests are diminished by participation in heavily regulated industry).
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3. University Affiliation
The third relevant market characteristic of legal education today is the predomi-
nance of university-affiliated law schools. Of the 190 ABA-accredited law schools,
for example, only a few are not currently affiliated with a university.75 This was not
always so. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when even formal law school
education was still not the dominant means of becoming a lawyer,76 many law
schools were proprietary schools unaffiliated with a university.77 Some were even
operated for a profit by their owners.7 In the early twentieth century, legal education
was in the midst of a transformation, led by the AALS and ABA, from a quite
profitable business that lacked the elitist-preference characteristics into an academic
enterprise that provided them. Faculty preferences drove this transformation:
Many law teachers in the beginning of the twentieth century...
were uncomfortable with [the stand-alone, for profit model].
They were not educational entrepreneurs, nor did they wish to
practice law actively. Pursuing nonpecuniary goals, some of
them brought the spirit of Progressive reform to the law teaching
profession. They viewed law as an instrument of social change
and began to stress the need to teach new lawyers that they must
meet their social obligations, not simply make money. And they
also saw that they had the opportunity to shape those who would
write future laws. Elitist preference began to emerge.79
7' New York Law School and Brooklyn Law School are prominent examples. I am not
concerned that these schools might have distinct claims, both because the law faculty of each
remains subordinate to its board and because my conversations with a number of
administrators at a variety of law schools convinces me that law schools generally do not
receive sufficient federal funds for the Solomon Amendment to be relevant to their decision-
making absent their connection to universities.
76 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 108-09.
77 See STEVENS, supra note 20, at 75-76 (detailing "massive expansion" in "part-time
legal education, especially in schools unrelated to universities" after 1900).
78 Shepherd, supra note 27, at 109.
" First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 339 (citations omitted). The road to an elitist
model of legal education was not free of detours and wrong turns, of course. From
1900-1920, for example, AALS member schools lost market share to non-members, id. at
347-48, and the ABA itself took time to consider and fully embrace the elitist model.
STEVENS, supra note 20, at 114-16 (discussing differences between the two organizations).
However, the two organizations eventually joined together to combat the non-AALS law
schools. First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 351-60. For evidence of the continuing
priority law schools give to "law reform" efforts, consider the following 1997 quote from
then-AALS President and NYU Law School Dean John Sexton:
America's lawyers have been charged with setting the nation's values
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Law schools could not simply switch to the elitist-preference model, however. Price
competition from non-elitist-preference schools limited the elitist-preference
schools' ability to raise prices or limit entry. 0 Financing the elitist-preference
schools' interest in scholarship and law reform efforts required additional resources.
Implementing law faculties' taste for promoting social change by converting law
schools into elitist-preference model schools thus required limiting price competi-
tion from other types of law schools and securing stable revenue sources to provide
the consistent funding needed to pay for scholarship and law reform efforts.
One of the solutions to these problems was for law schools to shift away from
the proprietary form of organization and to become university-affiliated, academic
schools.8 As Professor First notes, "[I]t was quickly recognized that the best way
to free law schools from dependence on consumer [i.e. student] control was to latch
- a charge that runs not only to "great cases" and major reform
movements, but also to the lawyer's day to day dealing with clients. In
our society, lawyers are and must be the conscience of both the legal
system and the client - for if they are not, no one will be.
John Sexton, Restoring the Notion That Lawyers Are Society's Conscience, AALS NEWSL.,
Apr. 1997, at 1. Similarly, Professor Anthony D'Amato wrote in a 1990 law review article:
[T]he legal profession has nothing to do with serving law and everything
to do with serving justice. To say that a lawyer is bound by "law" is in
effect to enlist lawyers in implementing the state's policies, whether
those policies be enlightened or brutal. It is to a dictator's advantage to
say that lawyers should be guided by "law." But "law" is not worth
being guided by, except to the extent that it reflects justice. If we don't
say that a plumber serves his tools, we should not say that a lawyer
serves the law. To the extent that we lawyers are professionals, our
allegiance is to justice in society.
Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 187 n. 135 (1990). For
a thorough critique of this attitude, see Michael P. Schutt, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the
Decline oftheAmerican Lawyer: Social Engineering, Religion, andthe SearchforProfessional
Identity, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 143 (1998).
S0 First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 348.
8Id. at 342.
We may thus view the reasons for a three-year course and a
university affiliation in terms of the law school's need for money. Both
are useful in meeting elitist preferences - being a fulltime law teacher
free from nonpeer control - and both are necessary to meet the reve-
nue requirements of the elite-model law school. Although the three-
year requirement could serve the profit-maximizing law school as well,
university affiliation was clearly a way of obtaining revenue while
avoiding profit-maximizing behavior.
Id. Another solution was implementing a mandatory three-year program of study, something
consistently justified as preventing competition from undermining the academic approach
to legal training rather than for its intrinsic academic value. Id. at 338 (finding that a three-
year course was a means of controlling inter-member competition for AALS.).
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on to the assets of universities."82 University affiliation was a deliberate strategy
undertaken to give law school faculties the resources to pursue the elitist-preference
model of legal education. The law schools traded their independence for financial
security and the prestige of university affiliation. 3
The critical point here is that American legal education developed into a model
of university-affiliated law schools in response to the desire of law schools and law
faculties for stable funding and prestige to enable them to focus their efforts on law
reform and scholarship. University affiliation, which I will argue below has impor-
tant consequences for the associational freedom claims made by the FAIR plaintiffs,
is not necessary for legal education, however. To the extent their relationship with
universities has costs for law schools, those costs must be seen in light of the law
schools' voluntary assumption of the relationship.
4. Summary
From this brief account of the historical development and market structure of
legal education come the following facts relevant to our consideration of the Solomon
Amendment. First, legal education is a business, albeit one dominated by non-profit
organizations. Second, it is a business with significant cartelized features, due to the
efforts of the ABA and AALS to implement the elitist-preference model of education.
Third, the elitist-preference model has significant costs for the consumers of legal
82 Id. at 341. First cites a 1906 lecture by Eugene Gilmore, a University of Wisconsin law
professor titled "The Relation of the University to Professional Instruction."
It was not enough for a law school to be affiliated with a university. He
felt there must be an end to the relationship, "which unfortunately still
exists" in many universities, in which the law school is a separate
school "conducted on a self-supporting basis with different standards
and ideals." Rather, it must be placed "on the same footing as other
instruction in the university."
Id. at 341-42. See also STEVENS, supra note 20, at 77-79 (describing some of the affiliation
agreements).
83 Not all of the elitist-preferences strategies worked out as planned. For example, during
the booming legal education market of 1920s, law schools experienced enormous increases
in revenues, only to see much of the money siphoned away by their affiliated universities.
First, Competition I, supra note 19, at 364. Rather than providing the law schools with secure
financing, many universities treated the law schools as a source of funds for other programs.
The alliance with universities as funding mechanisms "backfired badly: universities consis-
tently tapped the law schools." Id. at 397 (citation omitted). See also Shepherd & Shepherd,
supra note 41, at 2106-07; STEVENS, supra note 20, at 268-69 (discussing intra-university
competition for resources). This is not to say that all law school-university partnerships have
been unfruitful. The interconnections between the law school and economics department at
Chicago, for example, have greatly benefited both programs. There are relatively few such
examples, however. The degree of the university "tax" on law schools' revenue remains an
issue of concern in ABA-accreditation and AALS-membership inspections today.
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education, the consumers of legal services, and society as a whole. Taken together,
these facts suggest that less weight should be given to the interests of law schools and
law faculties in preserving cartel-enhancing features of legal education than the FAIR
plaintiffs contend. These facts also have troubling implications for the FAIR plaintiffs'
assertion of associational freedom claims.
B. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
The root cause of the dispute in FAIR v. Rumsfeld is the clash of law schools'
antidiscrimination policies, which include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis
for discrimination, and the congressionally-mandated military policies toward homo-
sexuals, which require such discrimination. Since 1993, the military policy on
homosexuals serving in the military has been the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
adopted by Congress in response to the Clinton Administration's initial expression
of interest in eliminating the prior complete ban on homosexuals serving in the
military. It may be that Congress is mistaken in its judgment or in the factual
predicates that underlie its policy decisions, but Congress's "stated objectives were
... couched in strikingly pragmatic and non-judgmental terms - overt homosexual-
ity was to be purged because it damaged unit cohesion, moral [sic] and discipline,
and not because it was immoral or illegal. 85
The policy was challenged on constitutional grounds and upheld by several of
the federal circuit courts of appeals.86 Congress's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
is (at least according to the courts) a lawful and constitutional policy, regardless of
its merits with respect to either the state's treatment of homosexuals or the
effectiveness of the military. 7 Only two facts concerning the "Don't Ask, Don't
4 See Eugene R. Milhizer, "Don't Ask, Don 't Tell": A Qualified Defense, 21 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 349, 351-66 (2004) (describing the adoption of the policy in detail); David
F. Burrelli & Charles Dale, Homosexuals and U.S. Military Policy: Current Issues, CRS
Report for Congress, RL 30113, at CRS-1-CRS-6 (updated May 27, 2005), available at
http://www.gay military.ucsb.edu/ResearchResources/2005-06_CRS.pdf (last visited Aug.
6, 2005) (detailing the enactment of the policy).
85 Milhizer, supra note 84, at 361 (citation omitted).
86 See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l
Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999).
87 After the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the
constitutionality of the policy was questioned by some commentators. See, e.g., Stevenson,
supra note 8, at 1338 (stating Lawrence's overturning of Bowers v. Hardwick eliminated
"two related grounds for upholding regulations that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation"); Burrelli & Dale, supra note 84, at CRS- 1 3-CRS- 14 (describing post-Lawrence
issues). Until the courts rule on any new issues for "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" resulting from
Lawrence, however, the policy remains legal and constitutional. I must confess that I do not
know whether the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy is a good policy or not. It certainly seems
foolish to me to exclude an entire category of citizens from service, and my own experience
with openly gay colleagues and friends leaves me puzzled why Congress believes the
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Tell" policy are relevant to consideration of the Solomon Amendment's constitution-
ality: (1) the courts have affirmed that the policy is a valid exercise of Congress's
constitutionally-granted powers over the military; and (2) it is a policy instituted by
Congress, not by the armed forces.
C. The Solomon Amendment
According to the FAIR plaintiffs, law schools began gradually to expand the
scope of the application of their nondiscrimination principle to sexual orientation in
the 1970s.88 This led the AALS to include nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation among its mandatory membership policies in 1990.89 (Although the
plaintiffs do not mention this, the timing coincided with a downturn in new graduate
hiring that prompted a crisis among new graduates and greater interest by graduating
students in non-law firm careers.90) Complying with the policy, law schools began
to exclude military recruiters because the ban on homosexuals in the military
prevented the recruiters from signing the required nondiscrimination statement.91
Despite this, the FAIR plaintiffs contend that law schools' career services offices
continued to cooperate with military recruiters outside of the on-campus recruiting
presence of openly gay soldiers would have a negative impact on unit cohesion, morale, or
discipline. I can think of many good reasons, however, why Congress, rather than law pro-
fessors, makes such decisions.
88 Brief for Appellants at 6, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
4433) [hereinafter Third Circuit Brief for Appellants], available at http://www.law.george
town.edu/solomon/documents/CA3Brief.pdf (last visited August 6, 2005).
89 Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, supra note 70, at 6.
9 See, e.g., Tina Gutierrez, Designing a Better Recruiting System: A Fantasy, 12 No. 7
LAW. HIRING & TRAINING REP. 2 (1992).
In 1990 the employment situation in the legal profession switched from
a seller's market to a buyer's market - literally overnight .... Law
school placement offices found on-campus recruiting down 10 to 30
percent in 1990 and again in 1991. Employers outside major metro-
politan areas were suddenly attractive to law students from East Coast
law schools. Public interest and government employers were also chal-
lenged to choose those few they could hire from among many highly
attractive candidates - often for little or no pay.
Id. at2.
91 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 6.
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programs and the military successfully recruited students despite being barred from
on-campus recruiting.92
Beginning in 1994, however, amendments to the Department of Defense
appropriation bills required the withholding of Defense Department funding from
any educational institution which prevented access by military recruiters to its
campus.93 In 1996, Congress expanded the scope of the funds involved, adding
funds from the Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, Labor, and
Transportation to those from the Department of Defense.94 In the fall of 2001, the
Defense Department began a more stringent enforcement effort, demanding a higher
degree of compliance than it had in the past.95 In particular, the Defense Department
now aggressively seeks to make, clear to universities that noncompliance by any
administrative unit of the university risks the federal funding for the entire
university, not just the subunit.96 Congress codified this more stringent approach in
the 2004 version of the Solomon Amendment.
97
This account reveals a critical feature: that Congress steadily increased the
pressure on universities to provide equal access for military recruiters by first ex-
panding the sources of funding at risk and then expanding the scope of the risk to the
entire university for each subunit's behavior. One reason for this progression is that
law schools generally receive little or no funding from the Defense Department and
92 Id. at 10-11. FAIR seems to want to have it both ways: it argues that exclusion from
on-campus interviewing serves a vital educational purpose even though the military is still
able to recruit effectively. Id. It almost suggests that FAIR's interest is in being seen to be
noncooperative with an employer unpopular with some students and faculty, without actually
doing anything that restricts the employer from hiring the students FAIR is educating.
Almost.
9' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558,
108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
"4 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 514(b), 110
Stat. 3009 (1996).
9 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 227 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005). Candor and pride both require that I note that I may have played a small role in
increasing the stringency of the enforcement efforts. On November 12, 2001, I published an
op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal that criticized the Society of American Law Teachers,
a left-wing faculty group that is also a plaintiff in the FAIR v. Rumsfeld litigation, for its
letter to deans reminding law schools of their duty to mitigate the presence of the military
and calling on law faculties not to allow the reaction to 9/11 to reduce efforts to discourage
the military's policy prohibiting membership to openly homosexual service men and women.
Andrew P. Morriss, Law Profs Throw SALT on 9/11 Wounds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001,
at A22. The overwhelmingly positive response I received, which included numerous promises
to contact Congressional representatives and Executive Branch officials, makes me hopeful
that the piece helped create support for a more aggressive approach to enforcing the statute.
9 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 9-10, 11-13.
97 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911-12 (2004).
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relatively little from other direct federal sources, at least by comparison to medical
and engineering schools. This makes the cost of sanctions applied only to law
schools relatively low.
Contrary to the characterization of the current version of the Solomon Amendment
by the FAIR plaintiffs as an overbroad restraint,9" this gradual ratcheting up of
pressure on universities is indicative of a narrowly tailored approach by Congress:
after attempts to achieve its objectives through less restrictive means failed, Congress
gradually experimented with broader approaches until it found the right combination
of funding sources and funding destinations to achieve its purpose."
The structure of the access required by Congress is also relevant. Congress
required only that law schools that provide some employers services do so on an
equal basis for military recruiters."° (Congress also provided an exemption for
schools with a tradition of pacifist beliefs."0t ) Law schools are under no obligation
to provide any employer with access. The general analogy is Title IX, which
requires parity between men and women's sports if sports programs are offered, but
does not require that sports programs be provided. 2
98 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 9,1 54.
9 The other potentially important feature of the Congressional debates is that during
debate over the different versions of the Solomon Amendment, various supporters argued in
favor of the legislation to, as the Third Circuit summarized,
"[S]end a message over the wall of the ivory tower ofhigher education"
that colleges' and universities' "starry-eyed idealism comes with a
price. If they are too good - or too righteous - to treat our Nation's
military with the respect it deserves[,] then they may also be too good
to receive the generous level of taxpayer dollars presently enjoyed by
many institutions of higher education in America."
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 226 (alteration in original) (quoting Rep. Richard Pombo). Other support-
ers made other arguments for the legislation, including linking it to military preparedness,
id. at 225 (quoting Rep. Solomon), but at least some supporters made explicit arguments that
the law would send a message to universities, a fact about which the Third Circuit and the
plaintiffs express considerable concern. Id. at 225-26; see also Third Circuit Brief for
Appellants, supra note 88, at 7-8. Because the arguments against the plaintiffs are so strong,
I do not believe these statements have an impact on the result.
1oo 10 U.S.C.S. § 983(b) (2003).
'o' Id. § 983(c).
12 See generally Eric Bentley, Title IX. The Technical Knockoutfor Men 's Non-Revenue
Sports, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 139 (2004) (explaining operation of Title IX); see also 20 U.S.C.S.
§ 1681(a) (1997) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a)
(2004).
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall
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Further, a key comparison between the facts in FAIR v. Rumsfeld and the facts
of many of the recent cases involving associational freedom is the impact of the
statute at issue. In most of the recent associational freedom cases, discussed in detail
below, the statutes at issue were antidiscrimination ordinances forbidding the organi-
zations in question from denying access to their facilities and/or membership to
protected classes. °3 At least in theory, therefore, the antidiscrimination statutes that
infringed on various organizations' associational freedom were based on legislative
determinations that certain distinctions among individuals were impermissible. For
example, statutes denying Rotary Clubs and Jaycees chapters the ability to exclude
women from membership increased opportunities for women."°4 The associations'
freedom to determine their membership was thus a casualty of state efforts to expand
provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
Id. The parallels between Title IX and the Solomon Amendment are extensive. Like the
Solomon Amendment, Title IX affects universities as a whole, not simply athletic programs.
The Supreme Court originally restricted its application to individual programs, rather than
entire universities. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). The impact of this on
athletic programs was large. "Because few athletic departments are direct recipients of
federal funds - most federal money for universities is channelled through financial aid
offices or invested directly in research grants - Grove City cabined Title IX and placed
virtually all collegiate athletic programs beyond its reach." Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d
888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997). The Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988), amended the statute to apply to all parts of university
programs: "For the purposes of this title, the term 'program or activity' and 'program' mean
all of the operations of ... a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a
public system of higher education; or... a local educational agency.., system of vocational
education, or other school system... ." As the First Circuit summarized, "[t]he Restoration
Act required that if any arm of an educational institution received federal funds, the
institution as a whole must comply with Title IX's provisions." Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894. Thus
like the Solomon Amendment, Title IX uses the leverage of all federal funding to require
compliance in a specific program area unrelated to the federal funding.
103 For example, Professors Chemerinsky and Fisk argue (in their article criticizing Boy
Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale) that
[e]nding discrimination by organizations like the Jaycees, the
Rotary Club, and the Boy Scouts - the entities involved in the leading
Supreme Court cases - serves many compelling purposes. Such
associations provide benefits to their members, ranging from training,
to business contacts, to the opportunity for school children to have fun
and learn life skills. All in society should have access to these benefits.
Indeed, ending discrimination advances freedom of association: it
allows those excluded to associate with the group and its members.
Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 595, 615 (2001) (citation omitted). A similar argument applies to expand-
ing access to law school placement offices.
104 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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opportunities. Similarly, the Solomon Amendment conditions universities' receipt
of certain federal funds on their compliance with statutory conditions allowing military
recruiters equal access to the universities' career services offices. 5 Although FAIR
casts its claim in terms of its members' desire to expand opportunities in the military
for homosexuals,"° the immediate effect of the law schools' policy is to restrict
access for law students to interview for job opportunities in the military.0 7 It is the
Solomon Amendment, by contrast, which is expanding opportunities for students,
by increasing the number of employers interviewing on campus.'0 8 The Solomon
Amendment is thus most accurately seen as a parallel to Title VII in terms of its
impact.' As I will discuss below, I believe this matters for assessment of the
interests of both the law schools and the government.
II. EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The heart of the plaintiffs' claim in FAIR v. Rumsfeld is that the Solomon
Amendment burdens their constitutional right to expressive association. 0 There are
three elements to expressive association claims: "(1) whether the group is an
'expressive association,' (2) whether the state action at issue significantly affects the
group's ability to advocate its viewpoint, and (3) whether the state's interest justifies
the burden it imposes on the group's expressive association."'' .
A. What Is an Expressive Association?
105 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2003).
106 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 9, H 7, 20.
107 The degree to which the restrictions imposed by the law schools actually restricted the
students' access to military jobs varied from school to school and certainly did not prevent
a determined student from finding out about JAG Corps opportunities. That, however, is not
the issue. The restrictions clearly disadvantaged the military recruiters to some degree and
harmed the military's recruitment efforts. The FAIR plaintiffs' attempt to argue that their
restrictions were ineffective is thus misplaced. See supra note 92.
108 I do not contend that the government has free reign to expand other people's oppor-
tunities into my space, associational or physical; merely, this is what it appears the courts
think the government is doing when they embrace strong non-discrimination principles.
Indeed, one participant at the SEALS conference suggested, perhaps not entirely in jest, that
the government could always simply seize interview rooms under eminent domain. See Kelo
v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
'09 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624 (characterizing antidiscrimination laws as providing
"equal access to publicly available goods and services").
"o Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 67, at 16.
" FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-58 (2000)).
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The Third Circuit majority dealt quickly with the first element, finding that the
law schools were expressive associations." 2 The panel's complete analysis of this
element was:
A group that engages in some form of public or private expression
above a de minimus threshold is an "expressive association." The
group need not be an advocacy group or exist primarily for the
purpose of expression. The Supreme Court held that the Boy
Scouts, which "seeks to transmit... a system of values, engages
in expressive activity."
"By nature, educational institutions are highly expressive
organizations, as their philosophy and values are directly incul-
cated in their students." Because FAIR has shown that the law
schools "possess[] clear educational philosophies, missions and
goals," we agree with the District Court's conclusion that they
qualify as expressive associations. Therefore, FAIR satisfies the
first element of the Dale analysis." 3
The District Court's analysis, although slightly longer, was similar in content and
tone." 4 The lower courts did not properly analyze this element, however, and law
schools are not expressive associations." 5
One indication that the lower courts paid insufficient attention to this element
is their failure to consider state law schools as members of FAIR. These schools,
as instrumentalities of state governments, have no First Amendment rights." 6 (As
"2 Id. at231.
113 Id. (citations omitted).
114 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 303-04 (D.N.J. 2003), rev 'd, 390 F.3d 219
(3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
"5 In commenting on Dale, Professor Epstein noted:
The right outcome in this case should not depend on a delicate balance
of what kinds of organizations count as expressive organizations under
the First Amendment. Rather, any proper decision must recognize that
the state has no interest in counteracting discrimination by private
associations that do not possess monopoly power.
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts,
74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000). He is right as a matter of what the Court ought to say
that the Constitution means. The argument here is within the context of what the Court has
said the Constitution means. I would certainly make different arguments to "Justice" Epstein
than I would to the current Court. Similarly, Professor Hills has offered a persuasive
alternative to the current expressive association jurisprudence. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 144, 219-29 (2003).
It is an alternative, however, and this Article is concerned with applying the current law
rather than altering it.
116 Amicus Brief of Law Professors and Law Students, supra note 5.
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discussed below, there is a parallel argument that the law schools' associational
rights are not burdened by the requirement of equal access as a condition of re-
ceiving federal funds.)
1. The Courts' Expressional Association Jurisprudence
The current touchstone for expressive association claims is the Supreme Court's
decision in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale."' In that case, the Court determined that
the Boy Scouts of America (a non-profit corporation) and the Monmouth Council of
the Boy Scouts (a separate non-profit corporation) were expressive associations." 8
The Court noted that the two organizations (which it did not distinguish) were private
organizations, had a clear mission of instilling values in young people, and com-
municated those values by having their adult members both expressly state the
organizations' values and implicitly convey them through their association." 9 This
evidence was sufficient for the majority of the Court to conclude that the Boy Scouts
of America and, implicitly, the Monmouth Council, were expressive associations.12 °
Dale does not tell us a great deal about what an expressive association is, and
a Third Circuit panel accurately characterized Dale's discussion of this point as
"very succinct. ' Moreover, Dale was not a unanimous opinion but a 5-4 decision
"1 530 U.S. 640 (2000). FAIR's dependence on Dale is ironic, given that case's holding
that the Boy Scouts may exclude openly homosexual adult members.
118 Id. at 644. The Supreme Court opifiion is vague about the council, saying it is a
"division of the Boy Scouts of America." Id. See generally Monmouth Council (NJ) B.S.A.,
http://www.monmouthbsa.org/ index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2005).
119 Id. at 649-50.
120 Id. at 656. There are problems with the Court's quick conclusion, as Professor Hills
notes.
Dale notes that the BSA's mission is to instill values in children: "It
seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a
system of values engages in expressive activity." But this assertion
cannot be as "indisputable" as the Court argues, given that the Court
itself implicitly disputed it in Runyon v. McCrary when it held that a
racist private school had no First Amendment entitlement to exclude
black children from its student body. Undoubtedly, [the schools in that
case] sought to transmit (racist) values. Runyon, however, perfunctorily
rejected their First Amendment claim by relying on the lower court's
determination that "there is no showing that discontinuance of the dis-
criminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching
in these schools of any ideas or dogma."
Hills, supra note 115, at 215 (citations omitted).
121 Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000).
Professor Epstein accurately summarizes the problem: "One clear caution sign is that the line
between expressive and nonexpressive organizations does not leap out." Epstein, supra note
115, at 139.
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- a margin of "disturbing closeness" ' in a case concerning "an issue so close to
the core of the First Amendment."' 23 Dale is thus limited in its usefulness on this
point both because it is too succinct to produce much guidance and because only
five members of the Court (including one who has announced her departure and
another who recently passed away) subscribed to its analysis. 24
Dale does not stand alone, however. Expressive association claims are at the
heart of several other Supreme Court opinions. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 25 the Court unanimously rejected a
claim by a group of "gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of[] Irish immigrants 126
that Massachusetts' antidiscrimination statute compelled the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council, "an unincorporated association of individuals elected from
various veterans groups," 127 which organized an annual St. Patrick's Day- Evacuation
Day 128 parade in Boston, to allow the gay pride group to march in the parade behind
a banner proclaiming its organization's name.'29 Unfortunately, Hurley also does not
tell us much about what constitutes an expressive association because it concerned
the organization of a parade. The Court found that parades are "a form of expression,
not just motion"'30 and so "[n]ot many marches . . . are beyond the realm of
122 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1917, 1934
(2001).
123 Id. at 1939.
124 Professor Richard Epstein makes a devastating critique of the whole idea of distin-
guishing among groups on this basis:
The short, unhappy truth is that the phrase "expressive association"
does not function well as a term of exclusion. Quite simply, it cannot
bear the weight that is thrown onto its fragile shoulders. It is not the
byproduct of any general theory. It came into use, purely and simply,
on the ground that the associational right is derived from the free
speech right, and from the free speech right alone.
Epstein, supra note 115, at 140.
Professor McGinnis makes a thoughtful case that Dale is part of "a coherent juris-
prudence that invigorates decentralization and the private ordering of social norms that Alexis
De Tocqueville celebrated in Democracy in America as being the essence of the social order
generated by our original Constitution." John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville 's America:
The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of SocialDiscovery, 90 CAL. L. REv. 485,487 (2002).
125 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
126 Id. at 561.
127 Id. at 557. The group was led by the delightfully nicknamed "John J. 'Wacko' Hurley,"
whose nickname unfortunately does not appear as part of the formal caption of the case. See
id at 561. In my opinion, this was a major tactical error by the plaintiffs in captioning their
lawsuit. The publicity, if not the outcome, would have been far more favorable if the suit had
been captioned 'Wacko 'Hurley, et. al. v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston.
128 Evacuation Day is a Massachusetts state holiday celebrating the departure of the
British Army and Loyalist civilians from Boston in 1776. Id. at 560.
129 Id. at 557.
130 Id. at 568.
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expressive parades."'' Since parades are inherently expressive, the Court held that
although the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade itself had no clear message,1
32
the parade organizer was entitled to act "like a composer" and select "the expressive
units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score may not
produce a particularized message, each contingent's expression in the Council's
eyes comports with what merits celebration on that day."'3 3 It seems, therefore, that
there are some activities, like parades, whose nature is inherently so expressive that
any association organizing the activity must be an expressive association. As a
result, however, "[t]o use a parade as a model for analyzing the expressive aspects
of association is to mistake the extraordinary case for the average.
' 131
In addition to Hurley and Dale, we also have the benefit of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,"' a 1984 case that upheld the appli-
cation of Minnesota's antidiscrimination statute to the Jaycees and forced them to
allow the admission of women as full members. Unlike the associations involved
in Dale and Hurley, the Jaycees lost their claim for associational freedom, poten-
tially teaching us something about the nature of the claim by comparison with the
successful claims in the later cases.
The Court acknowledged the high stakes in Roberts, observing "[t]here can be
no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire.' ' 13 6 The Jaycees lost nonetheless. The Court's analysis of the Jaycees' in-
terests is not as clearly delineated as the Dale majority's analysis of the Boy Scout's
interests; the Court mingles discussion of the extent of the impact of admitting
women on the Jaycees' message with its discussion of the content of the Jaycees'
associational freedom claim.'37 The Court did note, however, that "a 'not in-
substantial part' of the Jaycees' activities constitutes protected expression on po-
131 Id. at 569. Indeed, the Court noted that "the inherent expressiveness of marching to
make a point explains our cases involving protest marches." Id. at 568.
132 Id. at 557.
'3' Id. at 574. The Court acknowledged that "this view [may give] the Council credit for
a more considered judgment than it actively made... ." Id.
"' David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121, 163-64 (2001)
(citation omitted).
135 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
136 Id. at 623.
137 Id. at 626-27. Roberts is also read as distinguishing a commercial context (the Court
suggested that the Jaycees' main purpose was networking) from other First Amendment
values. See Paulsen, supra note 122, at 1925:
The opinion can be read, without much straining, as limited to
commercial contexts where a private organization cannot plausibly
point to any serious, nonpretextual expressive interests that would be
impaired by the government action in question; the result might not
extend to clubs that make out a stronger claim of some genuine
expressive motivation.
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litical, economic, cultural, and social affairs."'38 Thus, while the Jaycees may have
lost when the Court balanced their interests against Minnesota's, there is little doubt
that an organization with substantial activities of expression on political affairs
qualifies as an expressive association, whatever its other activities may be. The
Supreme Court's expressive association cases are thus of little direct guidance on
the question of what constitutes an expressive association largely because that issue
has not yet arisen in a case before the Court.'39
Fortunately, we have some additional evidence from lower court opinions about
what constitutes an expressive association. In The Circle School v. Pappert, the
Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania statute requiring all schools, public and
private, to conduct daily recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance and singings of the
national anthem violated the First Amendment right to expressive associations of
private schools. 40
138 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
139 We could read Dale and Hurley as qualifying Roberts, but this does not help the
plaintiffs. See McGowan, supra note 134, at 168-69 (giving such a reading). Read together,
the three opinions suggest that expressive associations have the right to exclude only insofar
as it is related to the expressive aspect of their association. Thus, the Jaycees were not
allowed to exclude women because the Court determined the exclusion was unrelated to their
expression. In contrast, the connection between expression and association was more direct
in Dale. A Scout leader qua Scout leader expresses Scout values in a way that a member of
the Jaycees qua member of the Jaycees does not express the Jaycees' values. (The Jaycees
obviously disagreed with the Court's conclusion on this point.) It is difficult to see how a
military recruiter expresses the values of the law schools at which she interviews students.
Even read in this fashion, therefore, these cases put the facts far closer to Roberts than to
Dale and Hurley.
140 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004). Mr. Hurley may yet have a further impact on the law. See
Adam Reilly, Talking Politics: Romney laughs offgay marriage, BOSTON PHOENIX, Mar. 26,
2004, at 7, available at http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/newsfeatures/this.just in/
documents/03702264.asp (last visited July 9, 2005) (quoting Massachusetts governor and
possible 2008 Republican candidate for president Mitt Romney as joking at a St. Patrick's
Day Breakfast, "There's nothing wrong with our supreme court in Massachusetts that having
Wacko Hurley as chiefjustice wouldn't cure!"). Despite quasi-diligent (e.g., Google) efforts,
I was unable to uncover the origin of Mr. Hurley's nickname.
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The schools' missions included providing students with "freedom of choices.
The challenged statute interfered with the students' choices about whether to say the
Pledge or sing the national anthem and thus with the schools' mission. To so find,
the court used language later relied upon heavily by the plaintiffs in FAIR v.
Rumsfeld: "By nature, educational institutions are highly expressive organizations,
as their philosophy and values are directly inculcated in their students."'42 Potentially,
at least, "educational institutions" might be as inherently expressive as parades,
although the court did not explain why this might be so. This language, however,
did not provide a blanket determination that educational institutions are expressive
associations per se, as can be seen by the subsequent sentence: "Each school plaintiff
has shown that it possesses clear educational philosophies, missions and goals."'
' 43
The Circle School decision thus teaches that the educational context is one where
expression may occur but, unfortunately, yields little guidance about exactly when
expressional associations exist.
In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University ofPittsburgh,'" a different panel
of the same court held that a fraternity was not an expressive association under Dale.
The fraternity chapter sued the university over disciplinary actions taken by the
university against the chapter.145 In rejecting the fraternity chapter's claim, the court
stated:
[A]n organization must do more than simply claim to be an
expressive association in order to receive the benefits of consti-
tutional protection. The Chapter's contentions along these lines,
along with its meager showing of a few minor acts of community
"4 Circle School, 381 F.3d at 182. Specifically, the court noted:
The Circle School's public mission statement includes the following:
"[w]e believe in the wisdom of each person to know what's best for
him or her," that "freedom to entertain ideas must be unbounded," and
that "the child person is encouraged to explore widely .. physically,
intellectually, emotionally, socially, and spiritually" so that s/he may
"grow[ ] in skills ofperception andjudgment." Project Learn, similarly,
states that "the educational program must provide the opportunity for
children to share in the planning and directing of the learning exper-
ience," and "[t]he final choice must always be the child's to participate
in an activity or not.., the teacher's responsibility is to help the child
to see clearly the choices available and the possible consequences of
particular choices."
Id. (citations omitted).
142 Id.
143 Id.
'44 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000).
14' The university stripped the organization ofits "recognized student organization" status
after several members were arrested on drug charges during a raid on the chapter's house.
Id. at 438.
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service, are insufficient to meet the minimum requirements for an
expressive association."4
If we look at these five examples, we can make some tentative conclusions
about what constitutes an expressive association. These types of examples are all
we have because the courts have not laid out a full-fledged associational freedom
doctrine.'47 The Boy Scouts, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, and
the two schools discussed in the Circle School opinion are clearly expressive asso-
ciations. The Jaycees, despite losing on the merits, are also an expressive asso-
ciation, even in the absence of an explicit statement by the Court to that effect.
Indeed, the Jaycees had perhaps the strongest claim to being an expressive association
because they are engaged in substantial amounts of protected expression on political
issues. The Pi Lambda Phi chapter is not an expressive association. The line
between an expressive association and an association that does not qualify for
protection thus lies somewhere between the Pi Lambda Phi chapter and the other
organizations. '48
The Pi Lambda Phi court thought there was relatively little on the unprotected
side of this line. "The expansive notions of expressive association used in Roberts
and Dale demonstrate that there is no requirement that an organization be primarily
political (or even primarily expressive) in order to receive constitutional protection
for expressive associational activity."'49 However, even the de minimis threshold
that the court discerned in Roberts and Dale could not be met by the fraternity
chapter. The organization could only point to a sparse record of community service
that the court characterized as not having "more than a mere[] incidental relationship
to the group's character" and unsupported claims of espousing the ideals of the
parent international organization. 50 Pi Lambda Phi suggests that the courts (or at
least the Third Circuit) are willing to take a reasonably close look when evaluating
an organization's claim to be an expressive association and whether rhetoric matches
146 Id. at 444.
14' Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and
the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1498 (2001) ("So far, the Court has given us
a series of examples without any defining principle."); Jason Mazzone, Freedom 's Asso-
ciations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 680 (2002) ("As the doctrine of freedom of association has
developed the examples are all the rules we have.").
148 Assuming, of course, that the Third Circuit is a reliable guide.
14' Pi Lambda Phi, 229 F.3d at 443.
150 Id. at 444.
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reality. 5 At last we have an example of an organization that is not an expressive
association.
There appears to be little doubt that the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, and even the
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (about which we know only that it
organizes the parade) all engage in more substantial and effective association for the
purpose of expression because they all do a great deal more expressing than does Pi
Lambda Phi's unfortunate Pittsburgh chapter. Just exactly what the Boy Scouts and
the veterans (who "compose" the parade) are expressing may be a bit muddled and
unclear,'52 but they (and the more coherent Jaycees, who take explicit positions on
issues) do express themselves explicitly and implicitly on a regular basis. The two
schools in the Circle School case also have a clear expressive goal that is tied to
regular action: educating children by letting children make their own choices; at
least that is how the court understands it.
What distinguishes the Pi Lambda Phi chapter from these other organizations?
It has ideals that apparently involve charitable works and a view of good citizenship,
just as the Boy Scouts and the Jaycees do. The main factual difference appears to
be that the fraternity chapter was not as effective at implementing its views as the
Boy Scouts and the Jaycees, since the chapter did not produce a record of substantial
charitable works. This cannot be the basis for the legal distinction; it would be
inappropriate for the courts to measure the value of expression by organizations'
effectiveness. 153 Hypocrites have free speech rights too; I5 4 in the marketplace of
'' Some commentators suggest that the Supreme Court did not do so in Dale. See
McGowan, supra note 134, at 123.
If the Court had scrutinized the evidence of the Scouts' expressive
activity as it did with the Jaycees and the Rotary, the record suggested
that the Scouts (as a national organization apart from the local sponsors
who actually instruct the boys), do not have common beliefs or teachings
about homosexuality. Under previous interpretations of the right of
expressive association, the lack of such common beliefs and the lack
of any express teachings about homosexuality would undercut the
Scouts' claim.
Id.
152 Professor Hills suggests there are good reasons for this lack of clarity. See Hills, supra
note 115, at 210-14.
113 See id. at 207 ("[J]udicial efforts to psychoanalyze associations are misguided because
they miss the institutional complexity of associations' representation of their members.
Institutions are not only amplifiers of their members' beliefs but also fora for members'
internal debate.").
"' It is a good thing for FAIR that this is true. There is no evidence that law schools
generally engage in anything more than lip service to their policies, failing to publicly
monitor firms that provide inhospitable environments for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, women,
or racial, ethnic, or religious minorities. There is little evidence that efforts to end discrim-
ination in the legal profession have succeeded, according to research by law professors
themselves. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Lawyers in the Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493,
613-14 (1996) ("The fact that the country's most prestigious law firms are nearly as
segregated today as the entire legal system was forty years ago stands as a constant rebuke
to the profession's attempt to claim the noble side of [the heritage of Brown v. Board of
Education]."). Further, there is widespread evidence that there are firms that are less than
hospitable to minorities, gays, and women. See, e.g., Cindy Collins, Scandals Rock Firms,
But Recruiting Efforts Stay on Track, 14 No. 11 LAW, HIRING & TRAINING REP. 1 (1994)
(reporting on various charges of discrimination against law firms). Astoundingly, the
AALS's response to these incidents was that law schools had great discretion in applying the
antidiscrimination policy. Id. at 11. Even more shocking, in light of the great weight law
schools claim to put on such policies, was the response of the schools:
Placement officials generally prefer to let students make their own
decisions about whether or not to interview with controversial firms,
based on such factors as how a firm is responding to a crisis, its past
record, and whether a problem is perceived as belonging to a particular
office or the firm as a whole. Lujuana Treadwell, assistant dean at the
University of California at Berkeley's Boalt Hall, says her office pro-
vides information from the National Association for Law Placement
(NALP) and other material that the firm supplies. "Our role is to make
information available to students." They can then do research and
decide on their own, she says. Treadwell is not aware that any student
has raised questions about the current Baker & McKenzie situation.
Id. at 11-12.
Moreover, there are a number of steps firms could take to make themselves more hos-
pitable to minority and female associates. See, e.g., Bobbi Bernstein, When Good Intentions
Aren't Enough: Observations of an Openly Gay Law Firm Applicant, 6 LAW & SEXUALITY
127, 133-37 (1996) (comparing some firms' reluctance to address gay issues to the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy and recommending affirmative steps to counter such reluctance);
Eyana J. Smith, Comment, Employment Discrimination in the Firm: Does the Legal System
Provide Remedies for Women and Minority Members of the Bar?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 789, 810-14 (2004). Law faculties do not appear willing to require participants in their
career services offices (CSO) to take affirmative steps to improve the status of women and
minorities, as they do not require employers to agree to such measures as a condition of using
the CSO.
Law schools not only do not exclude Congressional employers, thesource of the policy
regarding gays in the military to which they object, but some law schools are reportedly
engaged in efforts to create a new "Congressional clerkship" program to increase job oppor-
tunities for their graduates with the same institution that mandated both the military's dis-
criminatory policy and the Solomon Amendment. One might almost conclude that law
faculties object to the military rather than to the policy based on these examples. Even worse,
there are important questions raised in legal scholarship about how welcoming law schools
are to gay, lesbian, and bisexual students. See, e.g., Janice L. Austen, et. al., Results from a
Survey: Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Students' Attitudes About Law School, 48 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 157, 164 (1998) ("[T]he overall law school climate remains on the chilly side for
many GLB students."). One example cited in the above survey was the failure of many trusts
and estates classes to deal with issues relevant to homosexuals. Id, at 164.
Further, law faculties seem to be doing something in their teaching that motivates
students to drift away from public interest work. Citing fourteen studies, for example, a 1996
[Vol. 14:415
2005] THE MARKET FOR LEGAL EDUCATION & FREEDOM OF AsSOCIATION 449
ideas, comparing actions to words is an effective means of evaluating the merits of
organizations' and individuals' expressions. Moreover, given the extremely vague
notions of expression connected with the South Boston Allied Veterans Council's
organization of the parade,' it is hard to see the Pi Lambda Phi chapter's expressions
article in Law & Society noted that "[c]ommentaries and empirical studies over the past
several decades have consistently suggested that while a substantial proportion of incoming
law students are interested in careers in 'public interest law,' that interest wanes significantly
during law school." Howard S. Erlanger, Charles R. Epp, Mia Cahill, & Kathleen M. Haines,
Research Note, Law Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on an Old Question,
30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 851, 851 (1996). The study found similar evidence in an in-depth
look at the University of Wisconsin law school's 1976 graduating class. Id. at 852-54. See
also William Prewitt Kravolec, Contemporary Legal Education: A Critique and Proposal
for Reform, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 577, 580-81 (1996) ("A further serious defect with
conventional legal education is its tendency to undermine moral integrity.... [F]requently
the only moral concems explored in the classroom are those of the professor."). Similarly,
a feminist critique of law school's impact on the choice of public service, argued that:
[A]ccounts of women's experience at law school suggest that women
feel its demoralizing effects most keenly. They participate less in class,
because they are less comfortable in law school. In particular, they are
less comfortable with the Socratic method, especially the argumen-
tative polarized nature of discussion encouraged in many classrooms.
Women also perceive that they receive less professorial attention in and
out of class and less peer acceptance of their views. Women students
frequently report that their participation is met with scom and hostility.
They are also more isolated from the content of legal education as they
are unhappy with the unemotional, detached nature of legal analysis.
Lani Guinier's study reports that "laced throughout the interviews with
both white women and, to a greater degree, women of color, we hear
the desire to reinsert culture, race, politics and 'emotion' back into
legal interpretation."
Adrienne Stone, The Public Interest and the Power of the Feminist Critique of Law School:
Women's Empowerment of Legal Education and Its Implications for the Fate of Public
Interest Commitment, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 525, 543 (1997) (citations omitted). The
point of noting these critiques is not that they are necessarily correct, but that law faculties
seem to ignore internal critiques of their own behavior and the behavior of law firms that is
based on the same sorts of evidence and analysis that leads them to disapprove ofthe military
recruiter's presence. Yet, they seem to do nothing about it. The one constant to such analyses
is that they are a regular feature of the legal literature. See Maya Alexandri, Note, The
Student Summer Associate Experience With Harassing Behaviors: An Empirical Study and
Proposalfor Private Party Action, 19 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 43, 43 (1997) ("Sexual harass-
ment in law firms and law schools is a frequent topic of legal scholarship."). Alexandri
reports that a Westlaw search run in November 1996 (Sex! /s Harass! & law /2 firm law /2
school) generated 2,514 articles. Id. at n. 1. 1 reran the same search on August 5, 2005 and got
8,579 articles.
155 The best the Court could come up with was a suggestion that "[t]he parade's organizers
may not believe these facts [i.e., those hypothesized by the Court as the message of the gay
rights group] about Irish sexuality, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of
gays and lesbians or have some other reason for wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the
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as substantially less expressive in intent. The close look at the connection between
rhetoric and reality thus seems misplaced.
A better distinction of Pi Lambda Phi is to look at what the associations in the
cases were claiming the right to do. The Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, and the South
Boston veterans were arguing that they should be allowed to engage in core
associational activities: choosing leaders, choosing members, and choosing messages
for their public presentations. In Circle School, the schools objected to being told
how to conduct their classrooms. On the other hand, the fraternity in Pi Lambda Phi
tried to force a different association (the University of Pittsburgh) to refrain from
exercising its own associational freedom not to associate with the chapter. Unfortu-
nately for the FAIR plaintiffs, they sit in a position more analogous to the fraternity
chapter than to the others because the FAIR plaintiffs seek to limit the associational
freedom of their students who wish to associate with military recruiters.
A cynical, or perhaps realist, interpretation of the differences in the results might
rest on the higher status of the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, the schools, and possibly
even the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, 5 6 compared to fraternity boys.
Such an analysis echoes some of the academic criticism of the associational freedom
cases. Professor Mazzone, for example, argues that "[i]n the Court's approach,
association is simply a noun: associations are entities that speak."' 57 In short,
parade." Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 574-75 (1995).
'56 News accounts raise some questions about the Council. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note
140.
In 1992, smoke bombs and beer cans were thrown at some of the gay
marchers as bystanders shouted, "You bunch of fags, get out of
Southie" and "I hope you all die of AIDS, homos." In 1993, when
Hurley promised to continue the legal fight ("We'll go on until we have
a parade of a family nature," he vowed), gay marchers were spat upon
and pelted with snowballs as sharpshooters watched from rooftops.
Id.
157 Mazzone, supra note 147, at 679. Mazzone also contends:
[T]he Court appears to have only a very superficial and detached
understanding of what an association is. In speaking of associations,
the Court fails to offer any coherent account of what it understands the
term to encompass, and the most basic features of associations are
missing from the Court's discussion. The Court offers no recognition,
for instance, of the number or types of associations in the United
States, or the extent of citizen involvement in associational life. There
is no apparent understanding of what associations do, why people join
them, or what participation means to their members. The Court makes
little attempt to consider the conditions associations require to exist and
thrive or to understand the contributions or difficulties associations
may represent in a constitutional democracy.
Id. There is a well-developed literature with conflicting views on exactly this point, and it
may be that the Court would profit from considering the role associations play in democratic
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perhaps the conclusion we should reach is that the Boy Scouts, a long-standing
association with an impressive record of community service, has something to say;
the drug-using fraternity boys do not (or, at least, nothing to say that they cannot say
as well in a different fraternity that is recognized as an official student group).
We are left with the undeniable fact that the Supreme Court's Dale-based juris-
prudence requires an ability to distinguish between expressive associations whose
rights are protected and other associations whose rights are not. 158 As the description
of the expressive association cases above suggests, neither the Supreme Court nor
the lower courts have provided much guidance about how to distinguish one from
the other. This lack of guidance is in part the result of the courts until now having
been presented with quite easy cases on this point, and so the examples drawn from
the cases leave significant gaps unfilled.
Moreover, the emphasis in these cases has been on the expressiveness of the
association,'59 rather than on the associational nature of the expressiveness. The Boy
Scouts, Jaycees, South Boston veterans, schools involved in the Circle School case,
and even the unfortunate University of Pittsburgh chapter of Pi Lambda Phi are
obviously all associations. These associations can tell us who is in the group and
who is out - indeed, it was the attempt of individuals to acquire or retain insider
status that caused all but the Circle School plaintiffs to bring their actions. Mr. Dale
wanted to be a Boy Scout leader, women (through the state of Minnesota) wanted
to be Jaycees, the members of GLIB wanted to be in the Boston parade as a group,
and the members of Pi Lambda Phi wanted to be a "recognized student organiza-
tion." In each case, some entity told them they could not have the status they
desired. Thus, there is no question that all of these cases involve associations and
the issue of who gets to be in them. In FAIR, by contrast, the military does not want
to be part of the law schools; it merely wants to talk to law students. Because the
Third Circuit did not recognize the difference between these associations and the
law schools and law faculties which belong to FAIR, it neglected to pay adequate
attention to this element of their claim.
2. What Is an Association That Can Express Itself?
The critical question in FAIR v. Rumsfeld, unlike past Supreme Court cases
involving expressive association claims, is: what exactly is the association which
is to be freed from government interference? The plaintiffs assert associational free-
societies in developing its expressive association jurisprudence. See, e.g., ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000);
Hills, supra note 115. Thus far the Court has not considered these roles, however.
15' See Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. ofPittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000);
see also Hills, supra note 115, at 215.
9 Professor Hills aptly terms this the "megaphone" theory of association in which the
association serves merely to amplify the members' views. Hills, supra note 115, at 206-07.
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dom rights for law schools and law faculties."W Apparently, it is either the law
faculty as a body or the law school as a collective entity, depending on the school. 6 '
(Evaluating FAIR's members' claims is complicated by FAIR's insistence on main-
taining anonymity for most of its members based on its fear of retaliation by the
government. 62) In particular, the plaintiffs want the decisions of law faculties
governing which employers have access to the law school placement offices to be
recognized as an exercise of associational freedom.'63
The proper first question in evaluating FAIR's claims is whether law schools or
law faculties are "associations"?'" If so, we can then reach the second question of
whether they are "expressive" associations. The Third Circuit panel decision con-
centrated on the second question, focusing on the issue of expressiveness and ne-
glecting the precursor question of associational status.'65
" Second Amended Complaint, supra note 9,1 54. There are also individual faculty
members and students who are named as plaintiffs. The claims of these plaintiffs, as
individual members of the law schools or law faculties as associations, seem to me to stand
or fall with the associational claims of the collectives to which they assert they belong.
161 The Second Amended Complaint describes FAIR by stating:
[A]bout half the members of FAIR are law schools. The other half are
law school faculties that have voted as a body - by at least majority
vote - to join FAIR. The law school faculties that are members of
FAIR are the bodies that collectively, and autonomously, make law
school policy, including the decision whether and how to implement
non-discrimination policies."
Id. 17. It is unclear what distinction is intended by the description of "about half' of FAIR's
members as "law schools" and the other half as "law faculties." It may indicate something
about the official position of the dean.
162 Id. 7b.
163 Id. 46.
'" Professor Epstein argues that
[t]he fine-spun efforts to shoehom freedom of association into some ill-
defined expressive box will breed onlypointless and arcane distinctions.
What must be recognized is that freedom of association is "derivative"
not only of speech, but also of liberty and property as ordinarily con-
ceived. The upshot is that all private associations, regardless of their
internal structure and stated purposes, should receive the same freedom
afforded the Boy Scouts in this case.
Epstein, supra note 115, at 120. The question of whether law schools and faculties are
associations lies before the "expressive box" question, however. Thus, while I agree with
Epstein that the distinctions between expressive and non-expressive associations are difficult
to justify, I do believe that there is a role for an inquiry into whether an association exists at
all.
165 See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2004).
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There may be some differences from law school to law school, 66 but the vast
majority of American law schools are subunits of larger universities or colleges.'67
Universities with law schools are organized as not-for-profit corporations or other
entities; a small number of universities are organized as for-profit corporations.'68
Within these not-for-profit universities, law schools exist as administratively desig-
nated subdivisions, just as medical schools, dental schools, colleges of arts and
sciences, and so on, exist. Through the universities' bylaws and regulations, the
boards which control universities delegate to these various administrative sub-
divisions the authority and responsibility necessary to carry out various tasks. For
example, university subdivisions generally select new faculty members by inter-
viewing and choosing among potential candidates.
Such delegations are not absolute, however, since the boards retain either the
final, legal authority to act or the ability to revoke the authority to act. In the case of
hiring new faculty, for example, a subdivision may determine to hire Mr. Smith, but
the hiring is not final and the contract not completed until the university's board has
ratified that decision. Thus, despite the FAIR-member law school faculties' assertion
that they "collectively, and autonomously, make law school policy" for their re-
spective law schools,'69 it is unlikely to be the case that any of them are in fact the
legal entity responsible for setting such policies. (We could only know for sure if
discovery were conducted on this point.) Their policy-making may be tolerated or
even encouraged by their respective boards of regents, but it is not binding policy-
making; they are but servants of the board.
As subdivisions of universities, the law schools and law faculties have no inde-
pendent legal existence. Indeed, universities can and do dissolve and reorganize
subordinate units from time to time. 7 Thus, unlike the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, the
South Boston veterans, the schools from Circle School, and even the poor University
I am drawing on my own knowledge of university structure, my university's bylaws,
and conversations with numerous faculty and administrators at various colleges and uni-
versities around the United States. Because of the variability of the details, which are not
relevant to my argument, I am not providing citations to multiple different sets of university
bylaws or regulations.
167 There are several "stand alone" law schools, such as New York Law School. Although
not part of a university with separate departments, these law schools are subdivisions of an
overall organization, control of which rests with the overall organization's board.
6 E.g.,University ofPhoenix Online, http://www.uopxonline.com. See William Symonds,
University of Phoenix Online: Swift Rise, Bus. WK. ONLINE, June 23, 2003, http://www.
businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_25/b3838628.htm (stating that the University of
Phoenix Online's shares have "soared 557%, making it one of the best-performing tracking
stocks ever and helping it reach the No. 17 spot in Business Week's 2003 Info Tech 100 list").
169 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 9, [ 7.
70 At my own university, for example, the Department of Economics was transferred
from the College of Arts and Sciences to the Weatherhead School of Management a number
of years ago. The transfer was at the request of the department faculty, but such consent is
not required.
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of Pittsburgh chapter of Pi Lambda Phi, the individual law schools and faculties who
are members of FAIR are not associations that are protected under the First
Amendment.' 7 ' The associations whose rights are protected are the universities (or
the other entities) which operate the law schools.
Three thought experiments make clear why this is so. First, imagine that a univer-
sity has a law school and determines that the law school is no longer serving the
university's educational mission or that the university can no longer afford to operate
the law school.'72 Can the university close the law school over the objections of its
faculty? Clearly, the answer is yes. The university, not the law school faculty, owns
the law school physical plant, other assets (e.g., library books), and the intellectual
property (such as trademarks) of the law school.
'1 This issue arose in a peripheral way in the district court, in the context of a challenge
to FAIR's standing by the government. Examining the issue in the context of a standing
challenge, however, meant that the district court did not fully explore the issue. The court
held only:
The Court also rejects the Government's argument that the named
FAIR members do not have standing in their own right because there
is no allegation that, as mere components of a larger parent university,
the schools are "entitled" to bring suit on their own behalf, "potentially
against the wishes of the parent institution." In support of that
proposition the Government cites only to the Hunt requirement that
members have standing in their own right. That requirement goes to
whether members satisfy the injury, causation, and redressability
factors for Article III standing, and not to whether members have either
the capacity to bring suit or the blessings of their respective parent
institutions to do so. See Felson v. Miller, 674 F. Supp. 975, 977-78
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (explaining difference between standing and capacity
to sue). The Court declines to impose the capacity requirement
requested by the Government for purposes of standing.
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269,289-90 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
17' This almost happened recently. The University of Hawaii considered closing its law
school in 1995. See Hazel G. Beh, Downsizing Higher Education and Derailing Student
Educational Objectives: When Should Student Claims for Program Closures Succeed?, 33
GA. L. REv. 155, 155 & n.2 (1998). Restructuring, by closing programs and dismissing staff
and faculty, became more common in the 1980s. Id. at 165 & n.45. Significantly, Beh does
not bother to include faculty claims in her analysis because faculty claims under such
circumstances focus on whether there is sufficient financial exigency to justify closure and
whether or not contract procedures were followed in terminating the faculty. Id. at 197-98
n.198. Beh makes no mention of any potential faculty claim to override the university
decision. Moreover, the limited rights faculty do have flow from the grant of tenure, which
restricts the ability of the university to discharge the faculty, not the university's rights to
manage its subunits.
[Vol. 14:415
2005] THE MARKET FOR LEGAL EDUCATION & FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 455
Second, imagine that a university is contemplating making a major change in
its mission that affects the character of the law school. Can the faculty stop it from
doing so if the trustees vote to make the change? The answer is clearly no.'73
Third, can the university manage the law school's assets in the university's
interests rather than the law school's more particular interests? The answer is
clearly yes.174
"' This happened. See Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, No. CV 93 0133773, 1994 WL
463629, at *1, *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (rejecting litigation brought by students,
alumni, donors, a former trustee, and a current trustee challenging the University of Bridge-
port's affiliation with an organization controlled by the Unification Church), aff'd, 668 A.2d
688 (Conn. 1995). Interestingly, in light of their clear effort to surmount standing issues, the
plaintiffs in the Bridgeport case did not recruit a faculty member to be a plaintiff, perhaps
realizing that a faculty claim would be even weaker than the existing plaintiffs' claims. The
law school at the University of Bridgeport solved its problem by leaving en masse and affil-
iating with Quinnipiac College. Significantly, although the dispute between the university
and the law school included some preliminary legal skirmishing, the law school's departure
was ultimately an agreed-upon one and took place only after the law school became a
separate legal entity. See George Judson, Bar Group Approves Transfer of U. of Bridgeport
Law School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at B7 (describing transfer); Ken Myers, Bridgeport
Dean Staves Off Firing by Locking Himself in His Office, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at 4
(describing conflict between law school and university); Andrew L. Yarrow, Bridgeport U.
Reviews Offer From Moon's Church, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at B7 (noting that uni-
versity had agreed to the transfer of law school to Quinnipiac College). See also American
Association ofUniversity Professors, Report on Academic Freedom and Tenure: University of
Bridgeport, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1993, available at http://www.aaup.org/Com-a/Institutions/
archives/pre1995/bridgeport.pdf (describing academic freedom and tenure issues at
university generally).
7 See In re Antioch Univ., 418 A.2d 105 (D.C. 1980). The court noted that
[a]fter an evidentiary hearing of three weeks, the only legal theory of
reliefwhich could be discerned by the trial court was that "the revenues
and assets of the Law School are subject to a charitable trust, and that
surrender of these assets to the University's central administration will
result in a breach of that trust."
Id. at 111. This points to the lack of independent associational status of law schools. On
appeal, the Antioch plaintiffs attempted to assert a contractual claim, arguing that the law
school and university had contractually committed to a degree of independence for the law
school. The court rejected this claim:
The University is a not-for-profit corporation organized under the law
of the state of Ohio. The University, as any corporation, is governed by
the statutes of the state of its incorporation, its articles of incorporation
and its bylaws. The law school "is not organized as a corporation or
other judicial entity."
Id. at 112. The plaintiffs also sought to estop the university based on its acquiescence in prior
independent management of the law school. The court also rejected this claim, finding that
[t]his doctrine can have no relevance unless the party who seeks to
invoke it is an independent entity from the one which is estopped.
Thus, to apply the doctrine ofestoppel on behalf ofthe Board ofGover-
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Alert First Amendment fans undoubtedly will be thinking, "But does it matter
if law faculties are formal associations? Can't they be some kind of informal
association?" Certainly. However, to the extent that they are unincorporated asso-
ciations of law faculty, they are not the governing bodies of the law schools in
question. If at a faculty meeting, for example, a faculty member proposes a reso-
lution that states: "Resolved, no employer who refuses to sign the school's non-
discrimination policy may use the CSO facilities," and it passes, the faculty is acting
pursuant to its delegated authority from the university board. The university can in
these circumstances (and, in some cases, did) override the law school. The faculty
is not in this instance acting as an association of the faculty members. However, if
the faculty member proposes a resolution stating: "Resolved, this faculty condemns
Congress's 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy as antithetical to the values of this law
school faculty," and it passes, the law school faculty is acting in its capacity as an
expressive association but not in its capacity as an official body of the university
using delegated powers from the board.175 Thus, to the extent that a faculty is an
expressive association, it is no longer an official university body and loses its interest
in the university finances or the law school career services office.
If we examine the reactions of law schools to the Solomon Amendment, we find
additional support for the claim that law school faculties are not the entity with the
ultimate power to determine law school policies. Three things might have happened
at universities in response to the changes in the Solomon Amendment that placed
the larger universities' interests in jeopardy.
1. The law school faculty might have decided that it could not risk the larger
university's federal funds and have changed its career services policies in response
to the federal law. For example, at Yale Law School, the faculty voted to give the
dean the authority to suspend the nondiscrimination policy with respect to the military
if the dean determined that it was necessary to do so to preserve the university's
federal funding ($300 million in Yale University's case).176 The dean then did so.177
2. University administrations might have instructed law schools and faculties to
change their policies to avoid the loss of federal funding for the university as a
whole. For example, at New York University, the university president (a former law
school dean) wrote to the law school dean:
nors or the law school, the trial court would have been required to find
that these bodies are independent legal entities from the University.
Id.
7 It seems implausible that university boards would freely delegate authority to issue
resolutions that had any binding effect on the university to the faculty outside of the rules and
procedures of the university.
176 Declaration ofWilliamN. Eskridge, Jr., 43, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004) (No. 03-4433), [hereinafter Eskridge Declaration], available athttp://www.law.george
town.edu/solomon/Documents/Eskridge.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2005).
177 Id. 57.
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This risk [of the loss of the $130 million in federal funds] to the
scholarly and scientific pursuits of colleagues throughout the
University is one that I reluctantly must deem unacceptable, and
accordingly, I must direct you to instruct your staff to implement
the measures required to provide recruiters from the Armed Forces
equal access to School of Law students and placement and career
events and facilities ....
The law school then complied.'79
3. The law school might have refused to alter its policies and the school and its
associated university would then have lost the covered federal funds. I am unaware
of any law schools where this occurred. 8 '
The failure of law schools to refuse to comply with the Solomon Amendment
(i.e. to choose option 3) reinforces the conclusion that law schools and law faculties
are not independent associations but subordinate units of universities. Given the
serious harm the law schools allege has occurred to their interests as a result of the
admission of military recruiters with equal status to their career services offices,'
8
'
if law schools had the right to refuse to comply with the Solomon Amendment despite
university instructions to the contrary, it seems implausible to suppose that at least
some would not have done so.8 2 This is reinforced by the fact that under the earlier
versions of the Solomon Amendment in which only law schools lost funding for non-
compliance, some law schools did not allow military recruiters.
178 Declaration of Sylvia A. Law at Ex. 12, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-4433), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Documents/law.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
179 Id. 20.
80 I cannot exclude the possibility that some law school did pursue this course of action,
although it appears unlikely. The Third Circuit opinion stated that "[iln light of the millions
of dollars at stake, every law school that receives federal funds had, by the 2003 recruiting
season, suspended its nondiscrimination policy as applied to military recruiters." FAIR, 390
F.3d at 228. The opinion did not specify how the court had determined this, however, as it
provided no citation to the record.
18' Second Amended Complaint, supra note 9, in 50-51.
182 There is an alternative explanation consistent with the autonomous character claimed
by the law schools. It may be that law schools value the antidiscrimination principle less than
they value the loss of federal funds to the other units of the university with whom they must
interact on other issues. Law schools may not wish to admit that they have put a specific
price tag on the expressive message of nondiscrimination which they contend they can no
longer send. Being required to be honest about one's preferences is not a constitutional
injury, however.
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3. Associations and Exit
There are two critical features of associations that have not been addressed by
the existing case law: all members of associations have a cheap-to-exercise right of
exit,"' and formation of associations is trivially easy.' 84 Thus, Hurley and his fellow
South Boston veterans can form the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council. If
Hurley and his associates' attitudes toward gays, lesbians, and bisexuals are offensive
to some veterans, those offended can leave and form their own veterans council. If
Hurley then attempts to join the new organization, it can refuse him entry. The ease
of exit and formation is significant because it eliminates in many cases the need for
state intervention into associations' internal affairs. It also reduces the need to
restrict the state in the sort of bargains it offers to associations, since members of an
association who object to the association's acceptance of a particular bargain can
secede from it and form their own organization.
The hitch in relying on a competitive market for associations to resolve these
sorts of disputes arises when being part of a particular association has significant
value, generally by virtue of the association holding a monopoly of some kind. 5
Sacrificing current associational ties is more costly when doing so requires giving
up something of value. Thus, the South Boston veterans controlled access to the
Boston St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day parade, in which participation is more
highly valued than participation in an alternative parade organized by a hypothetical
competing group because the South Boston veterans' parade is the parade in Boston
on St. Patrick's Day - it gets television coverage, many participants, and a large
crowd.'86 If the reason that the South Boston veterans parade is more valuable than
its rivals' parades is because the South Boston veterans have obtained a monopoly
on the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day parade through state intervention (i.e., there
is only one parade permit available per day, and the South Boston veterans get first
choice of days because Boston politicians like them better than other organizations),
there are potential constitutional issues.8 7
83 Epstein, supra note 115, at 120 ("In a regime of freedom of association, all agreements
require unanimous consent, and any individual can withhold consent at will.").
84 If I wish to form an association, I simply do so. Nothing more is required. You are free
to do the same. (Whether either of us can convince anyone else to join or stay in the asso-
ciation is another question.)
'85 Epstein, supra note 115, at 121. Professor Richard Epstein has made the monopoly
point central to his analysis of the expressive association cases: "Quite simply, the instinct
runs as follows. The monopolist leaves his customers with no choice save that of doing
without. To offset that powerful advantage, he is therefore obliged to take all customers and
to do so at reasonable and (perhaps) nondiscriminatory rates." Id.
186 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 560-62 (1995).
187 This was not alleged in Hurley.
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Monopoly created by state-imposed barriers to entry need not be the only source
of value, however. For many people, being a Boy Scout is more valuable than being
some other kind of scout because of the Boy Scouts' reputation, history, and sig-
nificant national organizational support for local troops. In such cases, exit will be
costly because it entails giving up access to valuable assets.'88 There is no constitu-
tional issue, however, because having unpleasant choices (between principles and
merit badges, for example) is not a constitutional injury.
Outside of the state-imposed monopoly case, therefore, we can rely on the low
cost of entry and exit to allow associations to form and reform in response to their
members' preferences. Leaving one association for another is rarely costless, but
the costs will rarely be of constitutional dimension. State action may create addi-
tional hard cases (by forbidding certain associations through antidiscrimination laws,
for example), but in the marketplace of ideas, recognition of the ease of entry and
exit suggests that the most important remedy for dislike of a particular association
is to create a new one more to your liking.
The case for state intervention into the internal affairs of private associations
thus rests entirely on two conditions, both of which must be present to justify state
interference. First, there must be some sort of state-sanctioned monopoly that pre-
vents the normal competition among associations within the marketplace of ideas
from solving the problem through exit and creation of new associations. Second,
the state intervention must be aimed at increasing access to the monopolized good.
In the case of the Solomon Amendment, both conditions are satisfied. First,
there are significant barriers to entry in the law school market (ABA standards, for
example), and competition amongst law schools is highly restricted by the combined
efforts of the ABA and the AALS. These restrictions on competition involve state-
created barriers to entry in the form of restrictions on access to bar exams.'89 This
reinforces the case for the Solomon Amendment's constitutionality.
Second, if we consider students' interests, as we should in any analysis of law
schools' associational freedom since students are a significant part of law schools, 9 '
188 To the extent that the Boy Scouts have differentiated their product, they have market
power. This is not a constitutional concern, however, because it is not the product of state
action.
189 The ABA and AALS lobbied both for bar exams and for restricting applicants to
graduates of approved schools. See STEVENS, supra note 20, at 172-80; see also Fossum,
supra note 23, at 516 (noting that ABA standards are tied to bar admission requirements).
190 Somewhat ironically, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, who filed a declaration on behalf
of FAIR, Declaration of Erwin Chemerinksy, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Documents/Chemerinsky.pdf
(last visited Aug. 6, 2005), made a similar argument against the Supreme Court's decision
in Dale in a recent article coauthored with Professor Catherine Fisk. Chemerinsky & Fisk,
supra note 103. Rather than look to the Boy Scouts' leaders for articulation of the
organization's interests, something Chemerinsky and Fisk aptly term the "corporate gov-
ernance approach" and suggest is the "central flaw" in Dale, they argued that "expressive
associational rights are, at least in large part, the rights of the individual members of the
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the law schools' cartelization of legal education has resulted in reducing opportuni-
ties for students to interview with military recruiters. There may well be excellent
educational reasons, as the law schools assert, for law schools to have such a policy.1 91
However, the lack of a competitive market in legal education means that the courts
must consider not only the associational freedom of the law schools (if any) but also
the associational freedom of law students. Upholding the Solomon Amendment enh-
ances the associational freedom of the law students (giving them more opportunities
to associate, which they need not accept)'92 even if it reduces the associational
freedom of the law schools (by giving them a hard choice about the costs of
excluding military recruiters).'93 One additional implication of considering the costs
of association for the law faculties unhappy with'their universities' decisions about
compliance with the Solomon Amendment is that creating a law school outside of
a university eliminates the risk of losing substantial federal funds.'94 As noted
group." Id. at 604-05. Instead, the courts should consider that "[t]he views of the members
of the group are crucial in determining the expressive message of the organization." Id. at
606. When Chemerinsky and Fisk examined the Boy Scouts, they found that "the vast
majority of parents and children associate with the Boy Scouts because of the activities and
experiences it offers; unlike the Nazis, the Boy Scouts' views on homosexuality is peripheral
to the goals of the group." Id. at 608. In the case of law schools, the position of the "parents
and children" in the above analysis is occupied by law students, not law faculties.
Chemerinsky and Fisk ask, "Do the members of the Boy Scouts join it because of, or in spite
of, or even knowing of, its anti-gay message?" Id. at 609. In this case, we would have to ask
"Do law students attend law schools because of, or in spite of, or even knowing of, their anti-
military-because-it-discriminates message?"
... Second Amended Complaint, supra note 9, 1 24.
By implementing this policy, the school conveys a message that law
school personnel will not abet the discriminating employer's recruiting
efforts. To do otherwise is antithetical to both the law schools' message
and mission. This policy has substantive pedagogical value by pro-
nouncing values that students do not necessarily learn from casebooks
and lectures, values that law faculty hope students will internalize, and
the policy reifies those values, modeling behavior that it hopes its stu-
dents will follow in their law practices and lives as community leaders.
Id.
192 Presumably many law students have no desire to associate with military recruiters.
Some may even find military recruiters' presence distasteful. But these are not constitutional
injuries.
' I do not mean to suggest that any positive right to associate exists, only that the courts
should weigh the net impact on associational freedom on the components of an association
when considering an association's claims.
'94 Of course, starting a new law school is not a trivial endeavor. The accreditation (final
or provisional) of eleven new law schools since 1995, however, suggests it is not an
impossible burden either. Indeed, New York Law School was formed by Columbia University
law school faculty in response to perceived interference by the university in the law school's
affairs. See A History ofNew YorkLaw School, Founded in 1891, http://www.nyls.edu/pages/
2341.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2005) ("New York Law School was established in 1891 by
Columbia College School of Law faculty, students, and alumni who were protesting their
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earlier, conducting legal education from within a university was a deliberate choice
by elite law schools to gain their financial independence and to exclude the 'lower
class' law schools serving a less elite population. This choice can be changed.
Suppose, for example, that the Yale Law School faculty were to resign en masse
and form the independent New Haven Law School ("NHLS"). (I do not wish to
pick on Yale; I chose it as an example because its prominence and generally accepted
quality mean that its faculty would have little difficulty getting virtually automatic
AALS membership and ABA accreditation).'95 Among its policies would be a ban
on employers who did not comply with the school's nondiscrimination policy and
replication of all aspects of the former Yale Law School.'96 In short, the NHLS
would carry with it the Yale Law School's academic reputation but not its endow-
ment. Although the faculty might have to accept lower wages (at least for a time)
or teach additional courses (again, possibly only temporarily), they could also raise
funds based on their bold, decisive action, potentially offsetting the losses.'97
There can be no doubt that the NHLS would quickly gain both ABA accredita-
tion and AALS membership, given the widely acknowledged quality of its faculty
and programs and the circumstances of its founding. Within only a few years,
NHLS would likely be in the top ranks of U.S. News and other rankings, just as Yale
is now. Yale University's federal funding would no longer be at risk, and that uni-
versity might even consider a contractual arrangement with the NHLS (like the joint
degree program between Princeton's Woodrow Wilson school and NYU's law
school) 9 ' to allow dual degree programs and other interdisciplinary work. Indeed,
Yale might forego reconstituting its law school (at least for a time) out of respect for
the law faculty's action. Such an act would carry some risks for the faculty, but it
would also make a bold statement in favor of the nondiscrimination policy endorsed
by the faculty. Why don't they do this? I suggest this does not happen because law
faculties want to have their oligopolistic cake and eat it too. Not being able to do
so does not rise to the level of a constitutional harm.
trustees' attempts to dictate the teaching methods used by professors.").
9 Almost any law school in the US. News top 20 is likely to be in a similar position.
196 Delaware did something similar to gain New Jersey's corporate law business. See Joel
Seligman, A BrieffHistory ofDelaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 249 (1976).
197 Hillsdale College successfully replaced federal student aid funding with private funds
to prevent having to comply with federal regulations to which it objected. See 136 CONG.
REc. E. 3092, 3092 (1990) (quoting Detroit News story that "[w]hen the courts ruled that
accepting students with federal scholarship aid meant that Hillsdale would have to knuckle
under to Washington's red tape, the southern Michigan school simply replaced the govern-
ment aid with scholarship money of its own."). I am indebted to Nathaniel Stewart for
pointing out this success story.
198 See NYU Law, Joint Degree with Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/depts/admissions/info/J oint/princeton.html (lastvisited Aug. 5,2005).
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Moreover, the oligopolistic nature of legal education creates an additional
reason for Congress to be concerned about the military's access to career services
programs at law schools.'" When students enroll in a law school, they rely on the
school's expertise with respect to their future education and employment, matters
about which few entering students have significant knowledge. Indeed, this reliance
is the basis for whatever claim the ABA and AALS might be able to make that their
cartelization serves enrolled students' interests"' or the interests of the broader
community. Students have little prospect of exit, particularly after beginning their
second year because law schools refuse to grant more than one year's transfer
credit.20' At the very least, we might consider whether something akin to a fiduciary
obligation is created between the law schools and their students, given the relation-
ship of trust and confidence that exists between them. The general rule in such cases
is that the more the dependent party is at the mercy of the superior, the greater the
government interest is in regulating the relationship to protect the dependent. Thus,
although I do not believe there is a fiduciary relationship between law schools and
law students, it seems to me that the FAIR plaintiffs are essentially arguing facts that
would support the creation of such a relationship. The more they are successful at
asserting such a claim, therefore, the more they have justified the congressional
intervention in the form of the Solomon Amendment on the grounds of congressio-
nal concern for students' interests.
III. THE WEIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST
The Third Circuit noted that it "presume[d] that the Government has a com-
pelling interest in attracting talented military lawyers," but it found that this interest
could be achieved through means other than equal access to law school career
services offices." 2 Specifically, the court found that:
[u]nlike a typical employer, the military has ample resources to
recruit through alternative means. For example, it may generate
student interest by means of loan repayment programs. And it
may use sophisticated recruitment devices that are generally too
expensive for use by civilian recruiters, such as television and
radio advertisements. These methods do not require the assis-
tance of law school space or personnel. And while they may be
9 I am indebted to Robert G. Natelson for suggesting this point.
200 Of course, the cartel effect limiting enrollments does not serve the interests of those
students unable to gain admission.
201 STANDARDs FOR APPROVAL, supra note 26, at 41 (2004).
202 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977
(2005).
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more costly, the government has given us no reason to suspect
that they are less effective than on-campus recruiting.2 3
As a result, the Third Circuit quickly dispensed with the government's interest
as merely being the interest in the difference between these hypothetical alternative
recruitment schemes made possible by the military's "ample resources" and making
use of law school career services offices.2 4 In so doing, the Third Circuit ignored
an extensive line of Supreme Court precedent expressly prohibiting this type of
analysis.
Traditionally the courts have given great deference to the political branches to
organize the military. "[J]udicial deference .. . is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules
and regulations for their governance is challenged. '20 5 The deference stems from
Congress's "broad and sweeping" powers in this area2 4 and the lack of competence
on the part of the courts to second guess Congressional decisions about military
matters.0 7 As the Supreme Court cautioned in an earlier case, in this area "we must
be particularly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of
Congress or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the
Legislative Branch."20 8 In this case, which directly implicates the congressional
power to raise and support armies,2 9 there is no question that such deference is
compelled.
We need not speculate about the extent ofjudicial deference on military matters
connected with staffing the military, however. There is Supreme Court precedent
directly on point. In Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court rejected a constitutional chal-
lenge to the Selective Service registration system reinstituted by then-President
203 Id. at 234-35.
204 The Third Circuit performed one of my favorite judicial moves. Not only is the
government interest smaller than the government thinks, but the Third Circuit noted that it
may have actually forced the government to adopt a more effective military recruiting
strategy, stating that: "Not only might other methods of recruitment yield acceptable results,
they might actually fare better than the current system." Id. at 235. Even better, the
government's interest might actually be harmed by the Solomon Amendment, making the
Third Circuit's decision an improvement! "In fact, it may plausibly be the case that the
Solomon Amendment, which has generated much ill will toward the military on law school
campuses, actually impedes recruitment." Id. (citations omitted). Thank goodness we don't
have to rely on Congress to decide such questions! But see infra note 208 and accompanying
text.
205 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
206 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
207 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 (stating that "the lack of competence on the part of the courts is
marked" in this area); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.").
208 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68.
209 See supra note 7.
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Jimmy Carter and Congress in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.210
The plaintiffs sought to overturn the registration system and argued that it violated
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because only men were required to
register, rather than both men and women.21 ' The plaintiffs prevailed in the district
court.
2 12
The Supreme Court flatly and unambiguously rejected the district court's attempt
to distinguish registration from military affairs by characterizing it as an activity
involving civilians with only "indirect and attenuated" impact on the military:
We find these efforts to divorce registration from the military
and national defense context, with all the deference called for
in that context, singularly unpersuasive .... Registration is not
an end in itself in the civilian world but rather the first step in the
induction process into the military one, and Congress specifically
linked its consideration of registration to induction. Congressional
judgments concerning registration and the draft are based on
judgments concerning military operations and needs, and the
deference unquestionably due the latter judgments is necessarily
required in assessing the former as well. Although the District
Court stressed that it was not intruding on military questions, its
opinion was based on assessments of military need and flexibil-
ity in a time of mobilization. It would be blinking reality to say
that our precedents requiring deference to Congress in military
affairs are not implicated by the present case.213
Further, the Court clearly and unambiguously rejected the attempts by the district
court to distinguish the rationale for a male-only registration process from the
military considerations that dictated the congressional policy of prohibiting women
in combat:
The District Court stressed that the military need for women
was irrelevant to the issue of their registration. As that court put
it: "Congress could not constitutionally require registration
under the MSSA of only black citizens or only white citizens, or
single out any political or religious group simply because those
groups contain sufficient persons to fill the needs of the Selec-
tive Service System." This reasoning is beside the point. The
reason women are exempt from registration is not because mil-
itary needs can be met by drafting men. This is not a case of Con-
210 453 U.S. at 60-61.
211 Id. at 61.
212 Id. at 63.
2 Id. at 68-69 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 14:415
2005] THE MARKET FOR LEGAL EDUCATION & FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 465
gress arbitrarily choosing to burden one of two similarly situated
groups, such as would be the case with an all-black or all-white,
or an all-Catholic or all-Lutheran, or an all-Republican or all-
Democratic registration. Men and women, because of the combat
restrictions on women, are simply not similarly situated for pur-
poses of a draft or registration for a draft."4
If we examine these statements by the Court, we see that the courts are prohib-
ited from second guessing congressional "judgments concerning military operations
and needs.215 Moreover, the Court made clear that in structuring the military
recruiting system based on those assessments, Congress is free to distinguish among
groups based on their different status with respect to eligibility for military service.216
In Rostker, the majority found that this deference precluded the courts from
substituting their judgments about the need for or burden of registration of women.217
The majority specifically rejected the efforts of Justices White, Marshall, and
Brennan to make those judgments the subject of the kind ofjudicial inquiry engaged
in by the Third Circuit in FAIR v. Rumsfeld.21 Rostker is thus exactly on point with
the present case.
Indeed, the Third Circuit's speculation about alternative means of accomplish-
ing the military's objective of recruiting lawyers is precisely the kind of inquiry
foreclosed by the deference due to Congress over matters of military staffing.2"9
Congress has made a decision that openly homosexual people may not serve in the
armed forces and codified it through the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. As a
result, this congressional policy on homosexuals serving in the military allows the
government to pursue a means of recruiting lawyers that excludes homosexuals.
That policy includes using federal spending to gain equal access to the hiring halls
conducted by law schools.
What the courts may not do is create their own substitute method of recruitment;
they must defer to Congress's determination that in pursuit of its military staffing
policy, access to on-campus recruiting at law schools that provide on-campus recruit-
24 Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
215 Id. at 68.
216 Id. at 68-69.
217 Id. at 68, 78.
218 Justices Marshall and Brennan were not prepared to defer. See id. at 86 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court today places its imprimatur on one of the most potent remaining
public expressions of 'ancient canards about the proper role of women."' (quoting Philips
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring))). Neither was
Justice White. See id. at 83, 85 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting the appropriate resolution
is remand for hearings and findings on whether military needs require registration of
women).
219 FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
1977 (2005).
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ing and do not qualify for the pacifist exemption, is necessary to recruit lawyers.22
In Rostker, the congressional policy on women in combat permitted Congress to
establish a male-only registration system. In this case, Congress's legal and consti-
tutional limitation of opportunities for open homosexuals in the military allows it
to take steps to ensure that the military has access to the primary pool of qualified
lawyers despite that policy. In Rostker, the Supreme Court rejected both the dis-
senters' and the district court's attempts to show that Congress's decision was mis-
guided.221 In this case, the courts must also refrain from analyses dependent on
rearguing matters settled by Congress.222
In particular, the Third Circuit's "ample resources" argument is barred.223 The
military may indeed have the resources to engage in a wide range of recruiting
strategies, but the allocation of those resources is a matter for Congress and the
President. The courts may not second-guess those resource allocations, nor may the
courts, in weighing the government's interest in a method of recruitment, rely on
their own view of the sufficiency of military resources for a particular task. The
proper weight for the government's interest is thus not the marginal value of recruit-
ing via law schools' career services offices over loan forgiveness or other hypo-
thetical programs (which the Third Circuit hinted was negative).224 Instead, it is the
value to the government of the military being able to recruit lawyers in the manner
220 See generally Captain Christopher M. Ford, The Practice of Law at the Brigade
Combat Team (BCT): Boneyards, Hitting for the Cycle, andAll Aspects of a Full Spectrum
Practice, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2004, at 22 (describing combat support roles of army lawyers).
221 For example, Justice Marshall argued that "the Government makes no claim that
preparing for a draft of combat troops cannot be accomplished just as effectively by
registering both men and women but drafting only men if only men turn out to be needed."
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 95 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This type of analysis is exactly what the
Third Circuit's "ample resources" argument does. Note that the Court rejected the attempts
to second guess, even though women, as a class protected by the Equal Protection Clause,
receive greater protection than do non-suspect classes such as those based on sexual
orientation. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996).
222 The Rostker court laid great stress on the extensive deliberation in Congress over the
question of whether to require women to register with the Selective Service Administration.
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 74 ("The issue was considered at great length, and Congress clearly
expressed its purpose and intent."). In this case, the long history ofthe Solomon Amendment's
various forms demonstrates that Congress similarly gave sufficient thought to the issue to
warrant deference to its judgment. Complaint 27, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005) (No. 03-4433), available at http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/solomon/FairVRumsfeld.html.
223 This argument also suggests that the judges do not understand the concept of
"opportunity costs." "Perhaps the most fundamental concept in economics, the opportunity
cost of an action is the value of the foregone alternative action." Opportunity Costs, in THE
MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 50, at 315.
224 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 235.
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chosen by Congress, which is considerably greater than the Third Circuit's marginal
value calculation.
Of course, the law schools and law faculties in FAIR are not attempting to have
the courts say that the military cannot recruit lawyers. But what Rostker teaches is
that the courts may not second guess Congress on its decisions about the structure
of the military so long as Congress is not violating constitutional provisions (e.g.,
the Third Amendment by requiring the law schools to provide living quarters for re-
cruiters).225 Congress's assessment that military recruiters need equal access cannot
be replaced by either the Third Circuit or FAIR's opinion that they do not. On the
contrary, Congress's judgment is entitled to great deference from the courts. To
overturn Congress's judgment requires showing a constitutional violation in the
implementation of thatjudgment. This in turn requires showing that the law schools
and law faculties have an interest worth protecting which is affected by the Solomon
Amendment, an issue to which we now turn with an analysis of the weight of the
law schools' interests.
IV. THE WEIGHT OF THE LAW SCHOOLS' INTERESTS
Briefly stated, FAIR asserts that the law schools' interests in evading the
Solomon Amendment's sanctions derive from law schools' educational model. In
its trial brief, FAIR gave this succinct statement of the argument:
Law schools aspire to be much more than vocational schools
that teach "students to draft briefs, argue motions, depose
witnesses, and close deals." Whether a law school describes itself
as "a law school with a social conscience as well as an analytical
mind," or as "the place of instruction in all sound learning
relating to the foundations ofjustice," the universal foundation of
virtually all American law schools is the same: Law schools are,
and self-consciously define themselves as, shapers of future
lawyers who "can profoundly change our society, its mores and
values." They tell their students that "issues of justice are at the
225 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67:
None of this is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution
when it acts in the area of military affairs. In that area, as any other,
Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause
... but the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the
military context. We of course do not abdicate our ultimate respon-
sibility to decide the constitutional question, but simply recognize that
the Constitution itself requires such deference ....
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core of [their] mission" and they ask them "to accept the chal-
lenge of more clearly defining a just system.""2
Tied to this view is a strong emphasis on nondiscrimination, which extends to
the law schools' career services offices."27 When a law school retreated in the face
of the later, more effective versions of the Solomon Amendment, FAIR argues,
"some students and faculty . . . [came] to believe that the school is not in fact
committed to non-discrimination and that the law school has lost credibility to
preach values of equality, justice, and human dignity."2 ' As a result of students'
loss of faith in the law schools, "the Solomon Amendment has undermined the
institutions' core mission of teaching about justice and its mission to foster an
environment of openness and tolerance where the free exchange of ideas could
flourish. '" 9
A. Overstating the Impact of Military Recruiters' Physical Presence
FAIR's argument grossly overstates the impact of the presence of military re-
cruiters and neglects to take into account the structure of the legal education industry.
Let us begin with a critically important difference between the Boy Scouts in Dale
and the law schools in FAIR. Dale involved an attempt by New Jersey to require the
Boy Scouts to accept as a member - and not just any member, but a leader - an
individual whose conduct and views were at odds with the organization's views.23
In FAIR, on the other hand, the law schools are not asked to accept military
recruiters as staff members, faculty members, or students (the three groups which
might conceivably be analogous to being a member of the Boy Scouts). Rather the
law schools are required only to allow military recruiters access to their career
services offices on the same terms as other employers are given such access.231
Further, the law schools are not foreswearing all cooperation with discriminatory
employers, only allowing them a physical presence for on-campus interviews. Law
schools continue to cooperate with the military by providing official transcripts, for
example. The FAIR plaintiffs and the Third Circuit make much of the success the
226 Plaintiffs' Trial Brief, supra note 70, at 4 (citations omitted).
227 Id. at 5.
228 Id. at 15.
229 Id. at 17.
230 See Farber, supra note 147, at 1501 ("[C]ases to date have involved a fairly strong
nexus between membership and the choice of speakers, they may not be decisive in situations
where the nexus is weaker.").
231 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2003). And, of course, law schools can eliminate on-campus
interviews entirely if they choose and not lose federal funds eligibility for their universities
by then excluding the military.
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military enjoys with the law schools' limited cooperation.232 Compared to the
intrusion in Dale, this is small potatoes. As a leader, Mr. Dale would be represent-
ing the Boy Scouts. As recruiters, any military personnel in the Career Services
Office of a law school would not be representing the law school.233
The Third Circuit rejected this distinction for two reasons: (1) relying on its
prior decision in Circle School, even minimally intrusive messages are unconstitu-
tional;234 and (2) Dale requires a high degree of deference to the burdened entity on
whether the interest is significant.235 Neither of these rationales holds water.
In Circle School, the court rejected a state statute that compelled private (as well
as public) schools to have their students recite the Pledge of Allegiance and sing the
national anthem each day and to have teachers report students who failed to do so
to the students' parents.236 The plaintiff schools objected because this interfered with
their educational philosophy of emphasizing student choice.237 Conceding that the
recitation and singing took very little time out of the school day, the earlier panel of
the Third Circuit nevertheless held the statute unconstitutional.238
The facts of Circle School are readily distinguishable from FAIR v. Rumsfeld,
however. In the former, Pennsylvania sought to conscript school personnel to
deliver explicitly a state-endorsed message of patriotism. In FAIR, the law schools
are not asked to do anything beyond allowing the military recruiters to deliver their
own message on the same terms as other recruiters. Although in the absence of
additional speech from the law schools, a law student might conceivably infer some
endorsement of the military's hiring policies from the presence of the military re-
cruiter in the career services office, 239 nothing in the Solomon Amendment prevents
the law schools and faculties from vigorously denouncing the military's policy
toward homosexuals, petitioning Congress to change the policy, writing articles on
the evils of the policy, or taking a multitude of other steps to prevent such an
impression. Indeed, the AALS requires member law schools to take such steps.
24
232 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 10-11.
233 The district court made this point in distinguishing Dale. FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 305-06 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
234 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
235 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 230-35.
236 Circle School, 381 F.3d at 174--75.
237 Id. at 182.
231 Id, at 182-83.
239 Such a student should be receiving poor grades in law school for making such a de-
duction based on faulty logic.
240 Brief of Amicus Curiae Ass'n of Am. Law Schools in Support of Appellants at 3,
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
Somewhat disingenuously, the AALS told the appeals court that the Solomon Amendment
presents its members with a "Hobson's choice" by forcing them to choose between forsaking
federal funds and being "stripped" of their memberships in the AALS. Id. Of course, since
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The rejection of disclaimers as insufficient in Circle School does not apply to
FAIR v. Rumsfeld for two reasons. First, the problematic nature of the disclaimers in
the former rests on the contradiction between the school's explicit behavior (requiring
the pledge and song; reporting those who do not comply) and the disclaimer (we
don't like doing this), putting the school in the position of advocating and denying
student choice. Law schools are not asked by the Solomon Amendment to require
any expressive behavior by any persons associated with the law school. 4 '
Second, law schools have a variety of means available to them, of disclaiming
discrimination not available to the schools attempting to disclaim the mandatory
patriotic message. Law schools could, for example, require students to attend diversity
workshops that address discrimination based on sexual orientation, or to take classes
on antidiscrimination law; hold public forums, panel discussions, or symposia on
sexual orientation discrimination; publish articles by faculty in their own and other
journals; and add antidiscrimination components to other law school courses (as many
schools do with legal ethics). None of these efforts would violate the Solomon
Amendment. None would put the law schools in the position of the plaintiff schools
in Circle School of acting out the very behavior they seek to condemn.
Moreover, the Third Circuit's notion of "Dale deference ' 242 comes from its
strained reading of Dale's reversal of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision. 43
According to the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court was "faced with competing
views - the Boy Scouts' view that Dale's presence impaired their message and the
state court's view that it could not - the Supreme Court deferred to the Boy Scouts'
view."' We don't learn much more about "Dale deference" from the Third Circuit
opinion other than "FAIR . . . supplied written evidence of its belief that the
Solomon Amendment's forcible inclusion of and assistance to military recruiters
undermines their efforts to disseminate their chosen message of nondiscrimination"
required to succeed on their claim. 45 If true, of course, this reduces Dale's second
the AALS members determine AALS policy, it is quite likely that the organization would
allow (as it has in the past) members to comply with the Solomon Amendment without losing
their membership; if it did not, there would be no members left.
24' Note that law schools are forbidden from granting class credit for CSO activities by
ABA rules, further distinguishing the educational component from the career services function.
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL, supra note 26, at 28-30 (2004).
242 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 233.
243 To be fair, it is hard to understand Dale on this point. See Hills, supra note 115, at 215
("[O]ne looks in vain to Dale for some persuasive, principled, or even predictable limit on
the First Amendment protections enjoyed by associations."); McGowan, supra note 134, at
125 ("The Court's stated deference was inconsistent with its analysis in prior cases, raised
questions about the degree to which the speech clause protects expression rather than the
managerial discretion of expressive groups, and left the doctrine in an unsettled state.").
244 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 233.
245 Id. at 233-34.
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element to a requirement that the plaintiff provide some affidavits in support of its
claim.2
The Supreme Court has never treated plaintiffs' claims with such uncritical
acceptance in associational freedom cases.247 The Third Circuit attempts to explain
away this history by suggesting that the cases in which the Rotary Club and Jaycees
were forced to comply with antidiscrimination laws and admit women are distin-
guishable from Dale because the Supreme Court "examined the organizations' ex-
pressive charitable and humanitarian purposes and determined that they would not
be impaired by the forced inclusion of women members," something that was not
true in Dale.248 Unfortunately for this reading of Dale, whatever it was that the
Supreme Court did in the Rotary and Jaycees cases, it surely does not qualify as
"deference" to either organization. (As both groups invested the resources to litigate
their cases to the Supreme Court, they must have had strong feelings that the proper
outcome was not the one they got.) The Third Circuit's notion of "Dale deference"
is thus incoherent.
B. Overstating the Interest of Law Faculties in CSO Operations
The Third Circuit gave great weight to the FAIR plaintiffs' asserted interest in
managing their law schools' career services office operations as part of the educa-
tional mission of the law schools. 249 Doing so fundamentally misunderstands the
role of faculties in law school administration.
Law school faculties play an important role in a variety of aspects of law school
governance; the exact role varies from institution to institution. At some, elected
faculty executive committees oversee everything from faculty salaries to the overall
budget. At others, faculty governance is exercised through less formal means. In
all cases, however, faculty governance is a creature of the university's own internal
rules and regulations. Although the precise nature of faculty governance varies, we
can turn to the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) "Red Book"
for a faculty-oriented perspective on the importance of faculty contributions in such
246 As Professor Hills notes,
[T]here must be some limit to this deference if Dale is not to gut the
nation's antidiscrimination laws. If Exxon declares that its shareholders'
anti-union views will be impaired by complying with the Wagner Act,
does this assertion give Exxon immunity from laws protecting collective
bargaining? One assumes not, but one looks in vain to Dale for some
persuasive, principled, or even predictable limit on the First Amendment
protections enjoyed by associations.
Hills, supra note 115, at 215.
247 See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
248 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 233 n.12.
249 Id. at 237-39.
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matters. According to the report On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to
Academic Freedom, which is included in the "Red Book," the relationship among
the board, administration, and faculty of a university is guided by the general prin-
ciple that "'differences in the weight of each voice, from one point to the next,
should be determined by reference to the responsibility of each component for the
particular matter at hand."'250 The example the AAUP used to illustrate this principle
is the faculty's role in teaching and research.251 Since both the organization of
career services programs and the choices about federal funding are primarily
administrative functions, the faculty's voice is due less weight.252 Thus even the
AAUP, an organization dedicated to the rights of faculty, adheres to principles
which suggest that the faculty prerogative in such matters of relatively little import.
Moreover, the limitation of choice imposed by the cartelization of legal education
again rears its head.. If it were not for the restrictions on competition created by the
ABA/AALS oligopoly, students could choose to go to a school that either did not
have an anti-discrimination policy that violated the Solomon Amendment or one that
refused to accept federal funds. Because law schools and law faculties stand astride
the choke point between students and employment, however, their actions both
deserve more scrutiny and are entitled to less weight.
The Third Circuit found a "compelling analogy" '253 between the interests
asserted by FAIR and the interests asserted by the Boy Scouts in Dale. The Boy
Scouts thought homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the Scout Oath; the law
schools think discrimination against homosexuals is inconsistent with their values.
The Boy Scouts thought homosexuals did not provide appropriate role models; the
law schools think employers who discriminate do not provide appropriate role
models. The Boy Scouts teach by example; the. law schools teach by example. A
homosexual Boy Scout Leader would send a message that the organization accepted
homosexual conduct; a discriminatory recruiter would send a message that the law
250 Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to
Academic Freedom, 80 ACADEME 47,47 (July/Aug. 1994) (quoting from 1966 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure).
251 Id. at 48. The interest of FAIR's members has nothing to do with academic freedom,
since their asserted interest has nothing to do with the reasons for such freedom. See Richard
T. De George, Academic Freedom andAcademic Tenure, 27 J.C. & U.L. 595,595-96 (2001)
("The rationale for academic freedom is the preservation and development of knowledge....
This rationale both justifies the autonomy of the university and the academic freedom of
faculty members vis-i-vis both outside forces and the institution's administration.").
252 A similar argument is made by Professor Luize Zubrow in the context of student loan
forgiveness programs, which subsidize recent graduates' acceptance of lower paying jobs.
Professor Zubrow argues that faculty and deans are entitled to less deference in the structure
of such financial aid programs because the goals of the program are unrelated to educational
quality issues. See Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 451, 463 (1991).
253 FAIR, 390 F.3d at 232..
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schools accept employment discrimination.2 4 According to the Third Circuit, FAIR
wins, somewhat ironically, because the Boy Scouts can discriminate against homo-
sexuals.255
The analogy falls apart, however, when we consider the actual faculty interest
in controlling who is present in the building to conduct interviews and who must do
so across campus. 6 This is a distinction only law professors could love - the ed-
ucational mission of a law school is dramatically affected by a distance of what may
be no more than a few hundred feet. The interest of the law schools in the physical
location of military recruiters is simply not in the same category as the interest of
the Boy Scouts in determining who represents the organization as a leader.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should overturn the Third Circuit's decision in FAIR v.
Rumsfeld. It should do so because the law schools and law faculties in FAIR are not
expressive associations, because the Third Circuit under-valued the interests of the
government and failed to give proper deference to Congress's exercise of its con-
stitutional authority to raise and support armies, and because the FAIR plaintiffs do
not have an interest worthy of protection.
There is a broader point at stake here as well. Law faculties generally remain
captivated by their vision of themselves as leaders of an effort to reform law to bring
about a variety of progressive ends. There is powerful evidence, however, that most
of the legal academy are not even talking to each other but to the mirror. 257 A
comment (which drew many nods of agreement from the audience) at the SEALS
conference where I presented this paper captures the essence of how this outlook
influences faculty thinking: discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is
254 See id.
55 See generally Brief of Soc'y of Am. Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae, Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), 2000 WL 339882. FAIR is fortunate that
there is not a principle of "amici-estoppel" applied to such filings.
256 The Yale faculty, for example, seemed to have no problem with military recruiters
conducting interviews at the student union. See Eskridge Declaration, supra note 176, 1 31.
2157 See Tom Smith, A voice crying in the wilderness, and then just crying, The Right
Coast, http://therightcoast.blogspot.com/2005/07/voice-crying-in-wilderness-and-then.html
(last visited Dec. 12, 2005). Reporting the results from analysis of legal scholarship citation,
Smith notes that:
43 percent of the articles are not cited.., at all. Zero, nada, zilch.
Almost 80 percent (i.e. 79 percent) of law review articles get ten or
fewer citations. So where are all the citations going? Well, let's look
at articles that get more than 100 citations. These are the elite. They
make up less than 1 percent of all articles, .898 percent to be precise.
They get, is anybody listening out there? 96percent of all citations to
law review articles. That's all. Only 96 percent.
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morally wrong, and "I don't want employers that discriminate on my campus." All
well, fine, and good if the last sentence ended ". .. in my house." But it isn't "our"
campus in any sense of the word - law school campuses belong legally to the
university, which is controlled by the board of trustees." 8 Morally, a wide range of
groups have claims which are as good or better than the claims of law faculties: the
students, the alumni, the broader university community, and the public at large all
come to mind. Law faculties need to stop treating legal education as their private
playgrounds. Losing FAIR v. Rumsfeld might be a wakeup call some of them will
hear.
258 See Hills, supra note 115, at 185-87 (discussing reasons why academic freedom does
not mean faculty have complete freedom from coercion).
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